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FOREWORD
The United States has found no shortage of
difficulties in recent years as it has moved forward
in implementing its security policies toward the
Middle East and especially the Persian/Arabian Gulf.
Security threats resulting from an Iraq in turmoil and
an assertive Iran are near the top of U.S. concerns
about its future security. Efforts to deal with terrorism
and to encourage and support the efforts of regional
states to stem the rise of violent terrorist groups are
also important. Kuwait, while a small country with a
limited population, nevertheless has many of the same
concerns as the United States in that part of the world.
While Kuwait cannot act as a major regional power, it
can nevertheless still serve as a valuable ally, whose
contributions to regional security and democratization
should not be overlooked. These contributions center
on strategic geography, economic strength, and a
willingness to host U.S. forces that is long-standing in
a region where such actions can sometimes be seen as
controversial.
In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill provides
a comprehensive and nuanced examination of Kuwait
defense and security issues including a consideration
of the importance of the current security relationship
with the United States. He approaches this task by
carefully documenting historical and ongoing security
threats to Kuwait. Of special importance, Dr. Terrill
considers the history of difficulties seen in IraqiKuwaiti history and illustrates in detail how Kuwait’s
problems with Iraq which culminated with Saddam
Hussein are much larger and more complex than the
ruthlessness of one individual. Dr. Terrill outlines the
v

ongoing territorial tension between Iraq and Kuwait
since before the later country was independent, as
well as the various Kuwaiti attempts to control Iraqi
demands through diplomacy, regional consensus, and
foreign aid. Dr. Terrill also examines the historical basis
for Iraq’s claims against Kuwait noting that they have
no serious legal basis, but also noting that many Iraqis
appear to be open to the idea that all or part of Kuwait
should belong to Iraq. Kuwait’s current relations with
post-Saddam Iraq are not without notable problems,
and the Kuwaitis look at their northern neighbor with
great uncertainty. Iraq will continue to be of concern
to both Kuwait and the United States in forthcoming
years, and cooperation between the United States and
Kuwait will be valuable in addressing Iraq-related
problems. Kuwait, moreover, has the double difficulty
of facing expected critical problems from either a
strong, nationalistic Iraq or an Iraq that has collapsed
into anarchy.
Dr. Terrill also considers how an assertive Iran is
interacting with Kuwait at the present time and how the
two nations have a historic pattern of widely fluctuating
relations. While Kuwait and Iran are currently
superficially friendly to each other, they nevertheless
have strong conflicting interests. In particular, Iran
is not pleased with the close U.S.-Kuwait military
relationship and would like to replace U.S. influence in
the Gulf with its own. Kuwait, conversely, feels the need
to maintain open and friendly relations with its much
larger neighbor to limit Iranian intrigue and to assuage
Kuwaiti Shi’ites who view the Islamic Republic with
some warmth. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership
knows not to trust Iranian intentions and is sometimes
appalled by Tehran’s assertive rhetoric. Kuwaitis, like
the other Gulf Arabs, are deeply disturbed about the
vi

Iranian move to acquire nuclear capabilities, which
they view as an environmental and security threat. Nor
would Kuwaitis like to see the United States depart
from the Gulf and thereby remove the most serious
countervailing influence to Iranian dominance.
Turning to the issue of terrorism, Dr. Terrill notes
that Kuwait has shown considerable flexibility in
managing actual and potential problems. The Kuwaitis
have been especially effective in managing groups such
as the Peninsula Lions who have sought to overthrow
the Kuwaiti government and have also attempted
to kill U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait. This Kuwaiti
governmental dexterity needs to continue. Should
future problems develop between Kuwait and Iran or
southern Iraqi Shi’ite radicals, Kuwait must respond
to those problems in ways that do not alienate its own
large Shi’ite minority. A crisis in Kuwait’s Sunni-Shi’ite
relations would be a catastrophic setback to the region,
since Kuwait currently is universally viewed as having
the best Sunni-Shi’ite relations of any Arab Gulf state
containing large elements of both communities.
Finally, on the issues of reform and democracy,
Dr. Terrill notes the ongoing efforts at Kuwaiti
political modernization and inclusiveness. Kuwait
represents an important example to the region of
a partial democracy that is expanding and further
entrenching democratic approaches and procedures
to contemporary problems. Such moves are not easy,
and backsliding is always possible. Nevertheless, the
Kuwaiti approach illustrates the potential of the kind
of evolutionary reform that too often fails to interest
political theorists and journalists examining the region
since such occurrences are much less dramatic than
violent regime change and revolution, both of which
are processes that do not carry an automatic default to
post-revolutionary democracy.
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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated
with the U.S. presence in the Middle East. This analysis
should be especially useful to U.S. military strategic
leaders as they seek to address the complicated interplay
of issues related to Middle Eastern security in what our
local allies would see as a politically acceptable and
constructive manner. Some of the historical analysis
particularly regarding Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations will also
help U.S. leaders place current issues and perceptions
in a larger context that may help them work with
Kuwait and other Arab allies. It is hoped that this work
will benefit officers of all services visiting Kuwait or
the larger Gulf region, and that it will contribute to
strengthening the U.S.-Kuwait relationship.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been
of considerable value to both countries since at least
1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein’s brutal invasion of Kuwait
and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military
force in 1991. Saddam’s later defeat and removal from
power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the
alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in
the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important
U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious
national security concerns in the turbulent postSaddam era, some of which will require both Kuwaitis
and Americans to rethink and revise previous security
approaches, particularly to meet the shared goals of
reducing terrorism and regional instability.
Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has
struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges
related to protecting its citizens and its territory
from the predatory designs of large and dangerous
neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been
Iraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening and
subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more
problematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and often
extremely difficult relationship with Iraq, and a series
of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for
territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost
province of Iraq. Additionally, within Kuwait a widely
held belief is that large, if not overwhelming, portions
of the Iraqi public share this viewpoint. Iraq-Kuwait
tensions are therefore unlikely to disappear in the
aftermath of Saddam’s trial and execution. Iraq, even
without Saddam, is often viewed as a danger to Kuwait
xi

given this history, and ongoing Kuwaiti concerns about
Iraq underscore the need for continuing U.S.-Kuwait
security ties. Furthermore, both Kuwait and the United
States fear a rise in region-wide terrorism and sectarian
violence resulting from the current civil strife in Iraq,
as well as other factors. Should Iraqi’s sectarian strife
reach new levels of intensity, it is important that it does
not spread to other nations such as Kuwait. Kuwaiti
diplomacy and security planning must seek ways to
minimize the impact of the Iraq civil war in ways that
do not cause the vast majority of loyal Kuwaiti Shi’ites
to become alienated from their government.
Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empowered
Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power
vacuum created by Iraq’s political crisis. Kuwait, as
a small country, has little desire to offend a major
regional power such as Iran, and has occasionally
sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. Good
Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor
by significant elements of Kuwait’s Shi’ite community
and therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaiti
national unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership
fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and
is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the
United States to withdraw its military forces from the
region. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will never
fully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, like
other Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about the
Iranian nuclear program, although they also oppose
U.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they will
be placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regional
violence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes
as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomatic
and economic options for dealing with the crisis were
thoroughly explored and exhausted first.
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The United States also has a vested interest in
regional political reform and ongoing democratization
in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Kuwait has also shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government
within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing
democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend
with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that
has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this
monarchy and the history of democratic expression
are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity.
Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned
about maintaining their democratic image abroad
because of their continuing need for international
support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly
the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab
states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves
as an important if still incomplete example to the
region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular
vitality over the last year, and the United States needs
to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they
are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain
aware that democracy and moderation are not the same
thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a
number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic
to U.S. goals for the region.
This monograph notes that the United States can, if
insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationship
and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take
Kuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have the
potential to become more jaded and less cooperative
in their relations with the United States if they view
themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as
subordinates. The United States has a long history
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of resentful allies carefully measuring the degree
of cooperation they will give in return for security
guarantees. There is no need for this to occur with
Kuwait. Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relations
thus become important and may become especially
vital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S.
withdrawal under less than optimal conditions. Strong
efforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare in
Iraq from spreading to Kuwait under such scenarios.
Such efforts may require a great deal of new and
creative thinking by both Kuwaitis and Americans as
the threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now been
overshadowed by the dangers of spillover from an
Iraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and largescale subversion.
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KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM
Kuwait cannot overcome the basic strategic reality that it
is a small country with immense wealth with the wrong
neighbors.
Anthony H. Cordesman1
We fear civil wars. We fear that the situation in Iraq [will]
slide into a civil war.
Ahmad al Fahd al Sabah
Chief, Kuwaiti National Security Service2
February 13, 2007

Introduction.
Kuwait has been a close military partner of the
United States since a U.S.-led military coalition
liberated it from the iron grip of Iraqi occupation in
1991. The U.S.-Kuwait relationship since that time has
been consolidated as an important alliance for both
countries. Although Kuwait is a small country, it is also
strategically located and supports ongoing security
relations with the United States. The importance of
Kuwait’s strategic position can be expected to increase
as the United States reduces its presence in postSaddam Iraq but still seeks to influence events there
and throughout the Gulf region. Kuwait’s strategic
importance also increased following the U.S. decision
to remove its combat forces from Saudi Arabia in
2003.3 Additionally, Kuwait rests upon approximately
10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and is
expanding its efforts to explore for natural gas, making
1

it a vital economic ally. More recently, and also of
interest to the United States, the Kuwaiti experience
is emerging as an especially important ongoing
experiment in democratic institution-building and the
expansion of democratic practices. This approach to
governance is being implemented in ways that support
U.S. goals for increased democratization of the region,
although elections have also helped to empower some
extremely conservative Islamists, such as members of
the Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement, which is
the political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood.4
In April 2003 the United States and Kuwait reached
an important milestone in their national security
relationship due to the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein in a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. From
Kuwait’s 1991 liberation until Saddam’s ouster from
power in 2003, Kuwaiti fear of Ba’athist Iraq decisively
influenced virtually all of that country’s major
foreign and defense policy decisions. The removal of
Saddam is consequently a significant development
for the strategic situation in the Gulf in general and
most especially for Kuwait. More than just a hostile
and dangerous tyrant, Saddam was viewed by most
Kuwaitis as an archenemy. In large part, these views
were a direct result of the 1990-91 Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait in which Saddam ruled by torture, fear, and
execution. Nevertheless, his standing as Kuwait’s
primary enemy had other aspects to it. He came to
power and remained Iraq’s undisputed leader despite
that country’s previous vulnerability to recurring
coups. As dictator, Saddam was able to maintain power
through a wide array of rewards and sanctions directed
at the Iraqi population. Part of his system of control
was to avenge every slight to both punish his enemies
and more importantly to deter potential foreign and
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domestic plotters from moving against him. Revenge
for Saddam was a fundamental aspect of practical
governance that helped him maintain his unyielding
domination of the Iraqi military and population.
Consequently, in the 1991-2003 time frame, Saddam
was widely viewed as harboring hopes that he would
eventually be able to punish and perhaps destroy
Kuwait for its unwillingness to accept Iraqi rule and
its ability to rouse the world against the Iraqi dictator
in 1990-91. Saddam’s removal from power in March
2003 eliminated this personality-specific aspect of
Kuwait’s Iraq policy and provided at least a temporary
respite from the terror generated by a known enemy.
His execution by hanging in 2006 was greeted with
undisguised joy in Kuwait.5
Yet, despite an enormous sense of relief, Kuwait’s
national security problems have not disappeared with
Saddam’s removal and death on the gallows. Rather, the
end of his dictatorship has created new and extremely
serious national security challenges for Kuwait. Iran
has viewed Saddam’s replacement with a weak and
divided Iraqi government as an opportunity to expand
its political influence throughout the Gulf in ways
that are potentially threatening to Kuwait. Moreover,
a variety of alternative Iraqi political futures concern
Kuwait, and whatever future Iraq eventually finds will
occur only after a prolonged period of instability and
violence that could well involve Kuwait. Additionally,
Kuwaitis are concerned about an expansion of terrorism
in the Gulf due to increased regional sectarianism and
radicalism that may emerge as a by-product of Iraqi
factional and intercommunal warfare. All of these
problems are of special concern to the United States as
well, and addressing them effectively is vital to both
nations.
3

The Structure of the Kuwaiti Political System.
Kuwait has a citizen population of just over one
million. Most Kuwaitis are Sunni Muslims, but there is
also a large minority of Shi’ites that has been estimated
to include 25-30 percent of the citizen population.6
There is also a mostly noncitizen Iranian community,
which is estimated at around 60,000 residents.
Approximately 900,000 foreign private sector workers
and another 450,000 foreign domestic workers are also
in Kuwait.7 Members of these last two groups are almost
never granted Kuwaiti citizenship, and under most
circumstances they will never have the opportunity to
apply. Additionally, Kuwait has around 90,000 bidoons,
stateless individuals who live in that country but do
not have paperwork indicating that they are eligible for
Kuwaiti citizenship.8 Most of the bidoons deeply desire
Kuwaiti citizenship, and many feel a strong sense of
injustice that it has been denied to them.9
The Kuwaiti political system is dynamic and
complex, but at present it is clearly the most democratic
approach to governance within the Gulf. According
to political scientist Jill Crystal, “The one historical
gift geography gave the tribes of the Gulf before oil
was a gift of default: an outward orientation.”10 This
more cosmopolitan understanding of the world has
led to a continuing conflict between traditional and
modern values in Kuwait’s political culture. Mary Ann
Tetreault, another leading scholar on Kuwait, elaborates
on this situation by suggesting that, “[p]olitical life in
Kuwait oscillates between traditional monarchy and
oligarchic democracy.”11 In this regard, Kuwaitis often
refer to their country as a constitutional monarchy and
stress that Kuwait has a democratic tradition, while
admitting that their country does not follow a Western4

style model of government due to the dominant role
of the ruling family in the country’s governance. The
other important component of the political system is
the National Assembly (often called the parliament),
which was created by the 1962 Constitution and serves
as the legislative arm of the government. As will be
discussed below, this body has been a vital institution
with a turbulent history since it was formed shortly
after Kuwait’s 1961 independence.
Kuwait’s ruling Sabah family has been in power
since the mid-1700s, although there have often been
formal and informal curbs on the family’s authority
to govern. Foreign policy was the responsibility of
the British under a protectorate relationship that was
applied to Kuwait from 1899 until 1961. Other curbs
on the ruling family were a direct result of the internal
distribution of power within the emirate. Kuwaitis,
throughout their history, have shown respect for the
special historical role and leadership of the Sabah family,
while frequently rejecting the concept of absolutist rule.12
Kuwait also developed a strong system of consultation
and consensus in part due to the influence of the local
merchant class and also because of the leveling effects
of pre-oil poverty. In the early 20th century, successful
Kuwaiti merchants, upon whom the economy rested,
usually considered themselves the social equals of the
ruling family, and they often successfully demanded
to be treated that way. The power of the merchants
later faded as oil wealth strengthened the autonomy
of the ruling family and allowed them to gain further
popular support through the provision of increasingly
lavish government services.
Prior to its 1961 independence, Kuwait had
ongoing experience with various quasi-democratic
institutions, and the establishment of the 1962 Kuwaiti
5

Constitution was widely viewed as continuing and
codifying indigenous Kuwaiti values of democracy
and consultation. Newly-independent Kuwaitis did
not regard democracy as imported or imposed from
abroad.13 Rather, many citizens viewed it as indigenous
and important. Previous experiments in pluralism
included various advisory councils to the emir, some of
which were quite assertive.14 Moreover, on November
1, 1960, elections took place for the first time in Kuwaiti
history. These were for the position of “mukhtar,” a
kind of local leader in each of Kuwait’s villages and
municipalities. Every Kuwaiti citizen male over age
21 had the right to participate.15 Another strong and
viable democratic pillar is the diwaniya. The diwaniya is
a Kuwaiti custom whereby friends and acquaintances
gather to discuss various, often political, subjects,
sometimes with particular speakers, and with dinner for
those attending. In recent years, these gatherings have
sometimes been covered by the press.16 Traditionally,
only men attend diwaniyas, but this situation now seems
likely to change since women were granted the right to
vote and hold office in 2006 (see below). As women
become more involved in political life as a result of
their newly-established rights, it is expected that either
mixed gender or parallel diwaniyas for women will
become more important to Kuwaiti political life.
On November 11, 1962, Emir Abdullah al Salim
al Sabah signed the newly created constitution, thus
becoming the first constitutional monarch in the Gulf.17
The Kuwaiti Constitution specified that succession
to the position of emir is limited to members of the
Sabah family who are descendents of Emir Mubarak al
Sabah, known as Mubarak the Great (1896-1915). Emir
Mubarak broke with the Ottoman Empire in 1899 and
is considered to be the founder of modern Kuwait. The
6

monarchy also has an unusual tradition of succession
which, when called upon, makes direct father-to-son
succession unlikely. Tradition, but not the Constitution,
stipulates that an effort should be made to alternate
the position of emir between members of the two main
branches of the Sabah family. These branches are the
Jabir branch and the Salim branch, which trace their
lineage back to separate sons of Emir Mubarak. After a
serious 2005 succession crisis, the ruling family decided
that this approach would not be used in empowering
the current leadership.18 Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al
Sabah, the current emir, appointed Sheikh Nawaf al
Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, his younger brother as crown
prince, thus seemingly ignoring the long-standing
principle of alternating succession.19 Both the current
emir and crown prince belong to the Jabir branch of
the royal family. An earlier change that now appears
to be increasingly institutionalized is the separation
of the offices of the crown prince and prime minister.
Previously, both offices were held by one individual. In
the aftermath of the most recent succession, the offices
remained separated, at least for the time being.
The prime minister presides over the constitutionally-established unicameral National Assembly
which both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis often refer
to as the parliament. Kuwait held its first national
legislative elections in 1963, and the existence of the
parliament remains a continuing source of pride for
most Kuwaitis. There is, however, an ongoing conflict
between those Kuwaitis who seek a strong and viable
parliament providing oversight of the ruling family’s
public policy, and those who would prefer to see it
reduced to a rubber stamp and democratic ornament
to impress foreign countries, such as the United States,
that publicly support global democratic development.
7

This division has sometimes had regional implications
as the often confrontational Kuwaiti style of politics
has occasionally scandalized neighboring states with
more powerful and traditional monarchies. Such states
occasionally view Kuwait as a worrisome example for
their own population.20
The Kuwaiti parliament and the democratic process
in Kuwait have also experienced serious setbacks.
The royal government suspended parliament from
1976 until 1981 and then again from 1986 until 1992.
According to the Constitution, such suspensions are
legal if they are followed by new elections within 60
days, a provision which was ignored in each of these
cases. The parliament was briefly suspended again in
1999 over problems resulting from misprints in free
copies of the Koran published by the state.21 Another
brief suspension occurred in 2006. Both of these later
suspensions were constitutional since they were
followed by elections in the allotted time frame.
Kuwait’s parliament includes 50 directly elected
members, but their influence is diluted by the Cabinet,
which is appointed by the emir and must include at least
one elected member of the Assembly. Each member
of the 15-person cabinet has a vote in the parliament.
Additional cabinet ministers may be appointed from
the assembly, but there is no requirement for the
government to do so beyond the one constitutionallystipulated position. The government thus begins
any political debate with a virtually automatic 15vote advantage. This edge has been useful and even
decisive to the government on a number of occasions
such as the July 2006 reelection of incumbent speaker
of the assembly, Jassem al Khorafi, over his challenger,
Ahmed al Saddoun, in a 36-28 vote.22 Political parties
are illegal in Kuwait, although political blocs exist
8

and function under the guise of associations, cultural
groups, and other fronts.
Who can vote is also an important issue in Kuwaiti
politics. For most of Kuwait’s history, the right to vote
was denied to women, recently naturalized citizens,
and members of the armed forces.23 Kuwaiti women
received equal political rights in 2005, including the
rights to vote and run for office, through an amendment
to the election law. They voted in national legislative
elections for the first time in June 2006 when they
officially represented 57 percent of the electorate.24
Previously, women had voted in the April 2006 local
elections.25 Following this reform, the parliament is
seeking to expand the franchise to military personnel
and lower the voting age from 21 to 18.26 Both moves are
controversial, with a number of active duty and retired
military officers opposing extending the franchise to
the armed forces, due to a fear of politicization and
strongly-held views on the meaning of nonpolitical
military professionalism. Nevertheless, the search for
reform and greater government accountability has
been a recurring theme of Kuwait politics which has
reached a particularly important stage in recent years
and is examined in more detail later. Additionally,
for purposes of this monograph, it is important to
understand that Kuwaitis maintain a strong sense
of national identity and patriotism. Kuwait is not an
artificial state, nor does it lack a legitimate indigenous
political structure.
The Nature of Iraqi Claims against Kuwait.
Kuwait has faced numerous actual and potential
enemies throughout its existence and has been forced
to develop strategies to identify its most dangerous
adversaries at any particular time and then respond to
9

them. Scholar and former senior Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) official Graham Fuller has stated that
prior to the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait maintained
a “rotating enemies list” of countries seeking to
dominate, overthrow, or subvert the government.27
According to Fuller, this list has at times included Iraq,
Iran, Egypt (under President Nasser), and even Saudi
Arabia and Syria.28 In more contemporary times, Saudi
Arabia has been an ally rather than an enemy, although
a radical change in the Saudi government could lead
to existential danger for Kuwait. Syria currently has
limited ability and no clear interest in subverting
the government of Kuwait. In recent years, the most
dangerous adversaries Kuwait has faced are Iran and
especially Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Unfortunately, IraqKuwait relations have been so dominated by the figure
of Saddam Hussein in recent years that it is possible to
lose sight of the larger trends and problems, which are
significant. Moreover, it is often easy to assume that
Saddam’s departure from the scene is the beginning of
an inevitable upward trend in Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations.
Such developments are by no means assured.
While Kuwait has maintained historic differences
with a number of nations, only Iraq has a history of
intermittent but nevertheless overt challenges to the
right of the Kuwaiti state to exist as a sovereign entity.
There are several key reasons for this antagonism.
Kuwait has an approximately 120-mile land border
with Iraq, and Kuwaiti territory severely limits Iraqi
access to the sea. Iraq’s quasi-landlocked status has
been a source of frustration and resentment to a variety
of Iraqi regimes, and this situation becomes especially
problematic for Baghdad when difficulties exist with
Iran, with which it shares the Shatt al Arab waterway.
Perhaps not surprisingly, under these circumstances,
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there are some key historical instances where Iraqi
leaders have claimed all or part of Kuwait. These events
will be examined later. At this point, it is important to
highlight that the case for Iraqi ownership of Kuwait,
for reasons noted below, is not based on any valid
interpretation of history or international law, although
it is often viewed as credible by Iraqi writers, politicians,
and probably many ordinary Iraqi citizens.
Iraqi claims to Kuwait are based upon Kuwait’s
former status as a qaza (lesser district or dependency)
of the vilayet (province) of Basra under the Ottoman
Empire. Since Basra is now part of Iraq, various Iraqi
leaders have asserted that past links between the two
areas serve as a basis for claims that Kuwait is a part
of their territory. Unfortunately for these same leaders,
such assertions do not capture the actual nature of
Ottoman-Kuwaiti relations. According to historian
Frederick F. Anscombe, who has conducted extensive
archival research using Ottoman documents, Kuwait
was not integrated with or dependent upon Ottoman
Basra. Moreover, Ottoman officials in Basra were
quick to express their unhappiness about this situation
during the period of Ottoman sovereignty. Kuwaiti
possession of the best port in the area was a continuing
irritation to Basra officials who complained that
Kuwait was independently ruled by sheikhs, and not
“proper officials.”29 This historical research suggests
that during the Ottoman period, Kuwait was not ruled
from the territory included in present day Iraq, and its
status as a qaza was administrative convenience rather
than a working relationship. Ottoman officials in
Basra wanted control of Kuwait and were disgruntled
that they did not have it. To the extent that they were
subordinate to any other authority, Kuwaiti rulers
were subordinate to the Sultan in Istanbul. In contrast
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to Iraq, modern Turkey has unequivocally renounced
sovereignty over the Arab countries that were once
part of the Ottoman Empire.30
Just as important, Kuwait severed its political
ties to the Ottoman Empire in 1896 and asserted this
independence by concluding a treaty with the United
Kingdom in 1899. The driving force behind this change
was Emir Mubarak the Great, who was able to bargain
with the British for some significant concessions in
exchange for the protectorate relationship that both
sides sought. The United Kingdom (UK)-Kuwait
agreement, which was initially secret, included written
guarantees that the UK would intervene with military
force should Kuwait be attacked by a foreign power.
The Kuwaitis also received some British financial
support and placed their foreign and defense policies
in UK hands. The demise of the Ottoman Empire in
1918 led to an increasingly public relationship between
Kuwait and the UK, with British forces occasionally
being used to protect the Kuwaitis from attacking tribal
enemies in the 1920s and 1930s.31
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in assessing
the validity of Iraqi territorial claims, Kuwait has a
vastly different political culture and history than Iraq.
Kuwaiti nationalism has sometimes been described
as more developed and nuanced than that of Iraq,
and Kuwaiti citizens do not view themselves as a
lost province of Iraq. Historical claims of one state
seeking to absorb another seldom outweigh the will
of the population, even in much more compelling and
legally valid instances than the Iraq-Kuwait case.32 In
this regard, Kuwait’s ties with the UK did not interfere
with the continuing development of an indigenous
political culture or distinct Kuwaiti national identity
vastly different from that of Iraq. The British were
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primarily concerned with supporting and protecting
their trade route to India and ensuring that no other
external powers attempted to displace their influence
in Kuwait. So long as these goals were met, they usually
did not bother to interfere with Kuwaiti internal politics
or political development.33
The Looming Threat: Iraq’s Long-standing
Interest in Kuwait.
Iraqi interest in Kuwait predates the later country’s
independence going back to the era when both nations
had special relations with the British. Iraq was created
from the unification of three Ottoman provinces in 1920
and was made a British mandate until 1932. It was also
placed under the governance of key members of the
Hashemite family, which had supported the British
military during World War I, and continued to rule
Iraq until 1958. The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 193738 (and suspicions that it existed prior to that time)
seems to have led to a strong upsurge in Iraqi interest
in the future of the emirate and may have been the basis
for later calls to annex Kuwait by Iraqi government
leaders.34 Although oil was not to be exploited until
after World War II, Kuwait was beginning to show
real economic potential, which was of interest to the
Iraqis.
Hashemite calls for Kuwaiti unification with Iraq
are closely associated with Iraq’s second monarch, King
Ghazi ibn Faisal. Ghazi became king in 1933 following
the death of his father, King Faisal. According to Hanna
Batatu, a leading historian of this era of Iraqi history,
Ghazi had “little experience” in governance and “no
political understanding.”35 He did, however, have
strong anti-imperialist views as well as a predatory
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interest in Kuwait. King Ghazi made public statements
demanding the annexation of Kuwait and attempted to
incite Kuwaitis against the al Sabah family through his
tirades made from a private radio station maintained
in his Baghdad palace.36 No serious consequences
resulted from these broadcasts, and King Ghazi’s 1939
death in an automobile accident led to a respite in Iraqi
claims against Kuwait. Ghazi’s death also led to an
upsurge in Arab nationalist speculation that the king
had really been murdered by the British for opposing
an array of their interests.37 There were also suspicions
that British plots against Ghazi’s life might have been
abetted by veteran Iraqi politician Nuri al Said. The
two Iraqi leaders were known to detest one another
for a variety of personal as well as political reasons.38
Nevertheless, as late as January 1939, the British
opposed the removal of Ghazi from the throne when
they were apprised of maneuverings by Nuri to do
so.39 The exact circumstances of Ghazi’s death remain
controversial, and the conspiracy theories remain
unproven. Although the Kuwaitis were in no position
to influence these events, it is difficult to imagine that
Ghazi’s death was a cause of sadness for them.
Kuwait, in partial reaction to Ghazi’s earlier
threatening behavior, continued to reach out to the
Iraqis during its later years as a British protectorate in an
effort to establish normal relations and thereby reduce
the danger of Iraqi subversion or military action against
it. In March 1952, the Kuwaiti ruler visited Baghdad as
a guest of the Hashemite government, where he hoped
to improve relations between the two countries to the
point that Iraq would no longer question Kuwait’s
right to exist as a separate, independent state.40 This
visit went well and gave the Kuwaitis some hope for
better relations. Unfortunately, in early 1958 the Iraqi
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monarchy again indicated how quickly Baghdad’s
goodwill could dissipate when Kuwait was viewed as
insufficiently supportive of Iraqi priorities. At this time,
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Said became especially
interested in encouraging Kuwait to become part of a
projected union of Jordan and Iraq in what was called
the “Arab Union.”41 This effort was designed by the
Iraqi and Jordanian monarchies to help to limit the
Egyptian propaganda victory resulting from the 1958
Egyptian/Syrian union into one country, the United
Arab Republic (UAR). The Baghdad government
was then engaged in a bitter, losing struggle for Arab
leadership with President Gamal Abdul Nasser of
Egypt, and the Egyptian merger with Syria helped
Nasser to consolidate his already lofty image as a panArab hero.42 The Arab Union scheme was designed to
negate some of the propaganda value of the formation
of the UAR, while building a foundation for a
conservative, anti-Nasser Arab bloc.
The 1958 Iraqi revolution destroyed the Baghdad
monarchy and ended plans for the union with Jordan,
thereby halting the pressure on Kuwait to associate
itself with this effort. During the early stages of the
uprising, key members of the royal family, including
the young king, were massacred at the palace. Prime
Minister Nuri al Said, the consummate symbol of the
old regime, was killed in the street by an Iraqi Air
Force sergeant, while attempting to flee the country.43
After burial, his body was disinterred by an angry
crowd and dragged through the streets, hanged, torn
to pieces, and finally burned.44 While this revolution
ended the Iraqi monarchy’s pressure on Kuwait, it also
set the stage for a new and more threatening encounter
with a much more dangerous regime. The leader of
the Iraqi revolutionaries who became prime minister
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after the Hashemites’ fall was Brigadier Abdul Karim
Qassim, an erratic and unpredictable army officer who
was to emerge as one of Kuwait’s most threatening
enemies, just as the small emirate was preparing for
independence.
On June 19, 1961, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899
was terminated and replaced by a treaty of friendship
in which the UK acknowledged Kuwaiti independence.
Six days later, Prime Minister Qassim pounced on the
situation by stating that Kuwait was an “integral part
of Iraq” and that the UK had “declared an oil well a
state” by granting Kuwait full independence.45 The
Iraqis declared the 1899 agreement between Britain
and Kuwait illegal on the grounds that Kuwait did
not have the right to end its relationship with the
Ottoman Empire or Iraq as a successor sovereign.
While Qassim did not clearly threaten an immediate
military invasion, some of his public statements were
so confusing and contradictory that it was difficult to
discern how he planned to unify Kuwait with Iraq and
what the Iraqi military’s role was to be in implementing
such a unification.46 More ominously, June press
reports stated that Iraqi troops had moved towards
the frontier. These reports were later discredited, but
the prudent path at the time was to treat the danger of
invasion as serious.47
As the crisis unfolded, it is possible that Qassim may
have believed that average Kuwaitis sought liberation
from the rule of the Sabahs and hoped that Kuwait
would be unified with Iraq. It is not clear how the
Iraqi leader might have arrived at this belief, although
the late 1950s were a heyday of Arab unity rhetoric,
and Qassim’s own hatred of the Iraqi monarchy
might have led him to believe that such beliefs were
ubiquitous throughout the Middle East. One senior
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Iraqi army officer, on his own initiative, contacted a
Kuwaiti friend in Beirut during the crisis in order to
ascertain the correctness of Qassim’s assumption.48 He
was told that Kuwait was viewed as a distinct country
by its citizens who had no interest in becoming part
of Iraq.49 The Iraqi colonel considered this answer
surprising and quickly conveyed it to Qassim.50 There is
no evidence that Qassim was prepared to be receptive
to this information, but no evidence that he made any
effort to look into the matter more deeply, either.
In the face of the Iraqi threat, the Kuwaiti government sought British military assistance, and the UK
responded with Operation VANTAGE, the deployment of 8,000 troops in or near Kuwait along with
supporting air units.51 This was a serious deterrent force
at the time. The size of the Iraqi army was then around
60,000 troops, although most of these were far from first
rate. Iraq was further undergoing the difficult process
of transitioning from Western to Soviet weapons and
equipment. Moreover, Iraq’s already limited ability to
conduct a military invasion was quickly complicated
by domestic problems. Just as Qassim was attempting
to present a credible threat to Kuwait, Iraq’s Kurds,
who had initially welcomed the new Iraqi regime,
were increasingly at odds with Baghdad over the
issue of Kurdish autonomy. When Qassim issued his
claim to Kuwait, many Kurdish leaders saw this as an
opportunity to rollback government authority in the
Kurdish regions of northern Iraq.52 By September 1961,
Iraqi military forces were in open conflict with Kurdish
militias, and Iraqi Air Force units were bombing
Kurdish villages. The new military requirements of
a Kurdish rebellion enormously complicated any
potential invasion of Kuwait.
The Kuwaitis, for their part, were uneasy about
relying on British troops for their protection, since
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this dependency harmed their country’s claim to have
emerged from a colonial relationship. In addition
to seeking military protection from an outside
invasion, Kuwait also sought world recognition as an
independent, sovereign state. A major pillar of this
goal was achieved when Kuwait was unanimously
accepted for membership in the Arab League on
July 20, 1961.53 Iraq, the only state opposing this
action, made the surprising blunder of not having
a representative present for the proceedings that
allowed Kuwait to join the League.54 Had the Iraqis
attended these meetings, they should have been able
to prevent Kuwaiti membership since the acceptance
of new members is supposed to be unanimous under
Arab League rules. Kuwait was, however, blocked in
its efforts to join the United Nations (UN). The Soviets
contended that Kuwait remained a British colony in all
but name due to the British military presence. Moscow
correspondingly vetoed Kuwaiti membership in the
UN until October 1963 after the death of Qassim and
the establishment of a new and more constructive IraqiKuwaiti relationship. While the Soviets had based their
objections to Kuwaiti UN membership on the issue of
British influence, the primary reason for their actions
was to support their ally in Baghdad.55 In addition
to being anti-Western, Qassim usually had excellent
relations with the large and important Communist
Party of Iraq.56
Kuwait responded to these difficulties by seeking
an Arab League military force which would politically
overshadow although not actually replace the British
military deterrent. This action would clear the way for
Kuwaiti UN membership and wider global acceptance.
Egypt’s President Nasser strongly supported the
concept of an Arab League force for Kuwait due to
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an ongoing Egyptian rivalry with Iraq over Arab
leadership. The Arab League eventually deployed
around 3,300 troops to protect Kuwait. Around 1,200
troops were from the UAR and another 1,200 were sent
from Saudi Arabia. Jordan, which bore a special grudge
against the Qassim government, sent a contingent
of 300 troops as part of the force to protect Kuwait.57
Other nations contributing troops included Sudan
and Tunisia. President Nasser withdrew the Egyptian
contingent in December 1961 following a coup in
Damascus, ending the union between Egypt and
Syria. An additional unstated reason for the Egyptian
withdrawal may have been that Nasser took offense
upon hearing of an interview where the Kuwaiti emir
stated that he “actually relied basically on the British
for protection.”58 Jordanian and Saudi troops were
withdrawn in January 1963, and the remainder of the
Arab League forces left on February 19, 1963, by which
time the crisis appeared to have subsided.59
Iraqi Prime Minister Qassim was overthrown and
executed in a military coup on February 8, 1963. He was
replaced by a new military junta of Arab nationalist and
Ba’athist conspirators led by Colonel ‘Abdul Salam Arif.
Qassim’s death offered some immediate opportunities
for Kuwaiti-Iraqi reconciliation, although it remained
uncertain if the new Iraqi government would be
receptive to improved relations. From a practical point
of view, the new regime would have had at least as
many problems invading Kuwait as the old one. The
Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq had continued to
present a serious threat to the central government
as various Kurdish parties joined forces to demand
autonomy from Iraq’s central government. While
this fighting was punctuated with a series of truces,
it was still a central concern for the Iraqi government.
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Moreover, and perhaps almost as serious, Iraq had
now embarked upon its second military coup since
independence. This action indicated an increasing
politicized military that had twice overcome any
reservations about taking control of the government.
Such a situation substantially escalated the potential
for new coup plotters to seize the government
using rationales similar to those already in power.
The collapse of a taboo against coups can become
a staggering problem for military professionalism.
Under these circumstances, the best Iraqi army units
were needed for regime protection, and the military
remained subject to continuing vetting and purging
which undermined military efficiency and morale.
While Kuwaitis were not convinced that the Iraqi
threat should be viewed as an eccentricity of only one
man, Qassim’s execution did provide the emirate with
a chance to redefine relations with Iraq. Timing was
important to this effort. The possibility that the Arif
government would either consolidate its power or inflict a decisive defeat on the Kurds presented
Kuwait with significant strategic concerns about the
emergence of a re-energized and focused Iraqi threat.
Consequently, the Kuwaitis took advantage of the
change in governments to seek improved relations
with Baghdad and to try to establish normal bilateral
relations. In particular, the government made it known
that it was willing to provide Iraq with financial aid as
a way to defuse ongoing difficulties.60 This approach
seemed to yield significant dividends for both
countries as the Kuwaitis and Iraqis quietly negotiated
a long-term loan for Baghdad. Iraq correspondingly
recognized Kuwait as an independent country on
October 4, 1963.61
After the 1963 coup and Qassim’s death, Iraq’s
approach to Kuwait shifted from demands for total
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annexation to an interest in border modifications and
adjustments. When Kuwait’s emir visited Baghdad
in March 1965, he was asked to relinquish Bubiyan
and Warba islands which Iraq claimed it required for
national security. The emir refused, but the Kuwaitis
did provide Iraq with a continuing flow of foreign aid
and made other economic concessions which helped to
limit their problems with Baghdad.62 If Iraq could not
obtain the islands outright, the new Iraqi leadership was
especially interested in leasing Warba and at least part
of the larger island of Bubiyan as a way of mitigating
Iraq’s nearly landlocked status. The Kuwaitis strongly
resisted these overtures in the belief that such an Iraqi
presence would evolve into a permanent occupation if
Baghdad was ever allowed such a foothold. Iraq was
unable to press its claims as it remained interested in
Kuwaiti aid and also fell victim to a series of internal
coups, eventually leading to a Ba’ath party government
in 1968. This government included Saddam Hussein,
who built and consolidated his power until he publicly
established himself as undisputed leader in 1979.
Against this background, another important incident occurred in March 1973 when Kuwaiti and Iraqi
troops became engaged in a border clash at an Iraqi
military installation inside Kuwait at al Samita.63 The
Iraqi soldiers had been stationed within Kuwaiti
territory since 1969 with the passive acceptance of the
Kuwaiti government on the grounds that this presence
was a temporary response to Iraqi problems with Iran.
In March 1973, Baghdad attempted to expand this
presence and perhaps make it permanent leading to
a skirmish in which two Kuwaiti troops and one Iraqi
soldier were killed. Kuwait responded to the incursion
by declaring a state of emergency, closing the border,
and recalling its ambassador to Iraq. The Iraqi foreign
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minister then made matters worse by declaring that
“the whole of Kuwait is disputed territory.”64 He also
reiterated the Iraqi interest in Warba and Bubiyan,
stating, “We are not taking them from Kuwait; rather
we are giving up Kuwait for the sake of the two
islands.”65 The Iraqi belief that they remained entitled
to the whole of Kuwait thus never seemed far from the
surface and kept coming out in times of Iraqi-Kuwaiti
stress, regardless of what government was in power in
Baghdad.
Relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved
significantly following the July 1977 visit of the Kuwaiti
defense minister to Baghdad. When the Iran-Iraq war
began in September 1980, Iraqi interest in Warba and
Bubiyan increased dramatically due to the military
requirements of the ongoing conflict. The Kuwaitis
resisted this pressure, but did support the Iraqi
war effort in a variety of significant ways including
massive financial aid to Baghdad. In 1989, after the
war had ended, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince visited
Baghdad where he expected that the issue would be
less divisive because of Iraq’s strong support during
the war.66 The Iraqis, however, displayed no gratitude
and immediately began demanding an Iraqi role in the
disposition of the islands. Later, in an Arab League
meeting in Baghdad in May 1990, Saddam demanded
a number of Kuwaiti concessions, including the
leasing of the two islands to Iraq.67 Relations with Iraq
collapsed as Saddam prepared to resolve his difference
with Kuwait by invasion.
Kuwait Security Policies and Relations with
the United States before the 1990 Iraqi Invasion.
The looming invasion threat of 1990 raised important questions about how Kuwait was prepared to
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guarantee its sovereignty and protect its borders prior
to the attack. Iraq, as has been seen, posed a danger to
Kuwait even prior to Kuwaiti independence, while a
number of other regional states also presented serious
security concerns. Normally, a small state attempting
to protect itself from large regional neighbors seeks to
do so through alliances and where possible through the
development of indigenous military capabilities. The
ability to develop such capabilities will be examined
later, but this has always been limited due to Kuwait’s
small population base. Alliances are a more complex
matter.
When Kuwait became independent in June 1961,
the United States, which had maintained a consulate
there since October 1951, formally upgraded its
representation to that of an embassy.68 Nevertheless, as
has already been noted, the UK, not the United States,
was Kuwait’s most important ally in the early years
of that country’s independence. The United States was
interested in commercial relations with the emirate but
played no serious role in defending Kuwait during
this time frame. In the years between 1961 and 1990,
relations between the United States and Kuwait were
usually normal and sometimes good, although never
special. The Kuwaitis wanted to avoid the charge
of being overly supportive of Western rather than
Arab regional interests. The strong and vociferous
support that Kuwait gave the Palestinians also led the
government to condemn the pro-Israeli policies of the
United States.69 Kuwait continuously sought to polish its
Arab nationalist credentials through strong support of
the Palestinian guerrilla organizations and by allowing
Palestinians preferential entry to Kuwait as noncitizen
workers. Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat launched his
Fatah movement from Kuwait in the late 1950s, and
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the Kuwaitis gave him financial support from at least
the mid-1960s until 1990 when he betrayed them by
siding with Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 conflict.70
The Arab League’s strong support for Kuwait in
the 1961 crisis may also have helped to ensure that
the government maintained its consistent hard line on
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 1967, Kuwait, as well
as a variety of other Arab states, briefly suspended
oil deliveries to the United States and the UK due to
the support these countries provided to Israel in the
June 1967 War.71 Just prior to that conflict, Kuwait also
announced that it was sending troops to fight beside
the other Arab states.72 These troops never saw combat
since the war was short and decisive, ending in the
rapid defeat of Arab military forces. Additionally, the
small size of the Kuwaiti military meant that such a
contribution would have been primarily symbolic.
There were, however, limits to Kuwaiti support for
Arab nationalist causes, and Kuwait would not allow
them to get in the way of more serious national security
concerns. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war, Kuwait refused to sever diplomatic relations
with Washington or London despite the urgings of a
number of Arab states to do so.73
Kuwait and the United States became more interested in working together as a result of the 1980-88 IranIraq war when both countries feared an overwhelming Iranian victory. For reasons to be discussed later,
Kuwait initially maintained strict neutrality in this
conflict but later began to provide economic, logistical,
and diplomatic support to Iraq. As Kuwaiti support
for Baghdad grew, so did difficulties with Tehran. By
summer 1986, the Iranians responded by escalating
their attacks on Kuwaiti vessels in the Gulf. In December
1986, the Kuwaitis privately requested that the vessels
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be allowed to fly the American flag and thereby be
placed under the protection of the U.S. Navy. The
request was formalized in January 1987 and Kuwait’s
11 supertankers were placed under the U.S. flag.74
During the escort operations, the Kuwaiti government
paid some of the fuel costs for U.S. ships and aircraft
involved in the effort.75 Iranian attacks against Kuwaiti
ships ended.
At the beginning of the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait crisis but
prior to the invasion, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for Middle East Affairs John Kelly was asked about U.S.
defense obligations to Kuwait during a congressional
hearing. He responded that the United States had no
formal obligations to Kuwait, despite the reflagging of
Kuwaiti tankers in 1987.76 The reflagging, he explained,
was a discrete agreement that did not carry any larger
implications for defending the emirate. This answer
was merely a factual response to a specific question
about U.S. legal obligations rather than a statement
of policy. Nevertheless, Saddam heard an Arabic
translation of the response within a few minutes of the
statement being made, and was obviously encouraged.
Kuwait, at this point, had reason to deeply regret the
lack of formal security ties with major global powers.
The Iraqi Invasion, Operation DESERT STORM,
and the Emergence of the U.S.-Kuwaiti Alliance.
The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was
a defining moment in that country’s history. Shortly
before the invasion, Saddam accused Kuwait of waging
an economic war on Iraq. The Iraqi dictator claimed that
Kuwait was cheating on its Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil production quota and
was thereby flooding the international oil market with
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cheap oil. Such actions, according to Baghdad, played
a critical role in reducing the price that Iraq was able to
obtain for its oil. Saddam also claimed that Kuwait was
“slant drilling” into Iraqi oil fields, and then stealing
Iraqi oil along the Kuwaiti border.77 While Kuwait
was almost certainly involved in oil overproduction,
it was not the worst violator of OPEC quotas, and
Saddam had clearly over-dramatized the influence of
Kuwaiti actions on the Iraqi economy.78 Additionally,
no evidence exists that Kuwait was involved in slant
drilling into Iraqi oil fields.
The leadership, for its part, did not seem to
comprehend the danger Kuwait faced from Iraqi troops
massed on the border. Many other Arab leaders, such as
Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States Prince
Bandar, also believed that Saddam was merely flexing
his military muscles to intimidate the Kuwaitis into
financial concessions while not planning to invade.79
Kuwaiti leaders may have believed that the $13-20
billion they supplied to Iraq during the war with Iran
had purchased them some good will. More gravely,
they may have fundamentally misunderstood the
criminal nature of Saddam’s personality and regime.
Kuwaitis may also have felt that high-level efforts at
Arab mediation would calm the situation. Egyptian
President Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd were fully
engaged in an effort to reach a diplomatic compromise
between Iraq and Kuwait. As a result of what seemed to
be diplomatic progress, the emir stood down the army
to avoid provoking Saddam. Until the last minute, the
Kuwaitis seemed to have believed Saddam could have
been bought off. So far as they were concerned, it was
only a question of price.80
Saddam’s forces invaded Kuwait on August 2,
1990, and rapidly brushed aside disorganized Kuwaiti
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resistance. By the end of the day, Kuwait had been fully
conquered, and Saddam, through his dominance of
the Iraqi and Kuwaiti economies, controlled one-fifth
of the world’s known oil reserves. Iraqi spokesmen
declared that the invasion had occurred in response
to pleas from Kuwaiti revolutionaries for support in
establishing a new and “free” government. This story
quickly fell flat, and no Kuwaitis of any stature were
prepared to cooperate with the Iraqis. While Saddam
at first appointed a puppet government, he rapidly
changed his mind and annexed Kuwait on August
8. After Kuwait was annexed, members of the Iraqiappointed Kuwaiti government disappeared from
public view. Their leader, “Colonel” Ala Hussein
Ali, was not someone Kuwaitis or members of the
world community had ever heard of, and his actions
did nothing to bolster the legitimacy of the invasion.
The annexation was widely perceived as even more
illegitimate than the installation of a puppet government
and declared null and void by the UN Security Council.
Tellingly, some informed commentators suggested that
most ordinary Iraqis believed that Kuwait was part of
Iraq, and they supported Saddam’s decision to seize
the small country.81
Saddam apparently believed that he could obtain
worldwide acceptance or at least tolerance for the
invasion, perhaps with a minimum of trouble. Kuwait
was small and often unpopular since its vast wealth was
often a source of jealousy and resentment to the poorer
countries of the Arab World, despite an expansive
foreign aid program carried out by the Kuwait Fund
for Arab Economic Development (KFAED).82 Saddam
further maintained that he would be a better and more
authentically Arab custodian of Kuwait’s oil wealth
than the Kuwaitis would be. Saddam’s self-image as
a man of action in command of a powerful emerging
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regional power was buttressed by the additional
resources he seized from Kuwait. Saddam hoped that
those Arabs who were looking for a champion would
look towards him, and see his increased power as
serving those seeking to confront Israel and the West.
Indeed, some leftist Arab commentators responded
to these events by suggesting that a “cash-register
coalition” had been put together to destroy Arab and
Iraqi power, with the liberation of Kuwait serving as a
convenient excuse.83
The Iraqi dictator also seemed to believe that
deposing the monarchy would be widely accepted
in Kuwait or that there would at least be a significant
minority of anti-Sabah Kuwaitis willing to work with
the Iraqi occupation forces. Unfortunately for Saddam,
Kuwaiti nationalism turned out to be a more serious
factor than he had expected. Iraqi efforts to co-opt some
of the more vocal opposition members of parliament
failed even though this body had been suspended
by the Kuwaiti government in 1986, creating a clear
grievance in the eyes of many Kuwaiti legislators and
their supporters. No prominent Kuwaitis were willing
to ally themselves with the invaders, thus infuriating
the Iraqi dictator. Kuwait’s Shi’ite community was also
uncooperative and hostile, despite grievances that they
held concerning government discrimination. Saddam’s
continuing inability to find prominent Kuwaiti support
was a serious setback, since a denunciation of Sabah
rule by such people may have initially added some
credibility to his otherwise transparent claims that he
was liberating Kuwait. In an unpleasant surprise for
Saddam, nationalism was proving to be a powerful
force. Moreover, Kuwaitis were clearly indicating
that they were united in their opposition to Iraqi rule
regardless of the disagreements that they might have
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among themselves on political issues. This approach
was consolidated in October 1990 when the emir met
with Kuwaiti opposition groups in Jedda, Saudi Arabia,
and they agreed to present a united front against Iraqi
aggression. Around 1,200 Kuwaiti oppositionists
attended this meeting, where the emir promised to
restore parliament and expand political participation
in the government. Both sides would work together to
gain international political support for the liberation of
Kuwait.84
Kuwaitis remained uncertain about the prospects
that the world community would take meaningful steps
to rollback the Iraqi aggression against their country.
U.S. political and military leadership was united
behind the need to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq, but
there appeared to be much more uncertainty about
the need to invade and liberate Kuwait. It was by no
means certain that the United States would be willing
to commit itself to a military solution to the occupation,
and it was doubtful that any other approach would
work. It also remained to be seen if the United States
was interested in reinstating the Sabah ruling family
rather than some Kuwaiti opposition figures. President
George H. W. Bush’s “This will not stand” statement of
August 5, 1990, staked out the President’s anger, but not
his approach. Yet, even as the situation was becoming
more complicated, Saddam increasingly foreclosed
some of his own options for leaving Kuwait without a
war against the U.S.-led coalition. The Iraqi leader was
especially unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait after he
made significant territorial concessions to Iran in order
to be able to move his troops away from the Iranian
border and into the Kuwaiti theater of operations.85
Saddam’s intransigence meant that President Bush
was not faced with any subtle or reasonable sounding
proposals that may have split the coalition.
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Kuwait’s wealth was systematically plundered, and
the Iraqi military also engaged in gratuitous vandalism
and destruction of the Kuwaiti infrastructure. Iraqi
forces conducted summary executions and made
extensive use of torture against any Kuwaitis showing
resistance, and against Kuwaitis at random as a way
of terrorizing the population into submission. Much of
the violence against Kuwaitis and the large numbers
of reported murders and rapes may have appeared to
be as much the fault of the Iraqi army as of Saddam
Hussein.86 Some Iraqi soldiers may have hated the
Kuwaitis because of their wealth and opportunities,
which contrasted greatly with the years of Iraqi
deprivation and suffering during the 1980-88 war
with Iran. Supplementing random violence, special Iraqi military units appeared to have been assigned
the task of ensuring that the occupation quickly
broke the Kuwaitis’ will to resist incorporation into
Iraq. Saddam may have been attempting to eradicate
the concept of a separate Kuwaiti identity, and he
may have been personally angered over the Kuwaiti
unwillingness to play the role he had scripted for them
as grateful subjects who wished to be reunited with the
Iraqi homeland.
Saddam also remained unconvinced that the
Americans would attack him for the sake of Kuwait.
A constant theme in the Iraqi media was that the
Americans could not cope with the demands of a long
war such as he expected that a new Iraq conflict could
become.87 Additionally, the Iraqi dictator may have
wondered how much the United States cared about
who ruled Kuwait so long as cheap oil continued to
flow from the region and so long as other U.S. regional
allies such as Saudi Arabia were protected and placed
off limits to any further predatory inclinations by
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Saddam. The dictator strongly indicated that Kuwait
was a special case, and Iraqi history seemed to indicate
a pattern of interest in Kuwait that was not matched
by territorial aspirations elsewhere (except along the
Iranian border). Kuwaitis could perhaps be forgiven for
being uncertain that the United States would confront
rather than accommodate the dictator.
The U.S. congressional decision to authorize
potential military action against Iraq by President Bush
was a close series of votes that may have failed had it
not been for a final U.S. effort at a diplomatic solution in
Geneva that was not accepted by the Iraqis. The Senate
vote to authorize military action passed by a narrow 5247 margin, while the House passed a similar measure
by a much stronger vote of 250 to 183.88 The war began
on January 17, 1991, with a prolonged air campaign
followed by 100 hours of ground combat in which the
Iraqis were defeated and driven from Kuwait. Later,
when Iraqi Army units surrendered en mass to the U.S.led coalition forces, many Iraqi soldiers claimed that
they never believed in the war. As suggested earlier,
this is not a claim that is subject to easy confirmation
or denial. During the occupation, Saddam hanged an
Iraqi colonel who was widely believed to have been
helping the Kuwaiti resistance, indicating some level of
humanity by a high ranking military officer in Kuwait.89
Additionally, some Kuwaitis reported other instances
of collaboration of Iraqi soldiers with Kuwaitis under
occupation.90
As they prepared to retreat, Iraqi forces set 732 oil
wells on fire. Some observers suggested that the torching
of the Kuwaiti oil fields was done for military reasons
such as the effort to obscure troop movements. The
Iraqis would have been especially interested in masking
troop movements from overhead aircraft and mounted
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a ground counterattack against U.S. forces from the oil
fields. Nevertheless, the oil well fires had virtually no
tactical effect. The counterattack was quickly defeated,
and aircraft operations were not seriously disrupted by
the smoke. It is also possible that the Iraqis had some
economic motives in seeking to destroy the Kuwaiti oil
industry to help enable Baghdad to continue selling oil
after the war. A final possibility was that the operation
was carried forward in revenge against the Kuwaitis
for gaining U.S. help to best the Iraqi dictator. This
revenge-oriented aspect of Saddam’s personality is, as
previously noted, one of the reasons he was able to rise
to the top of the unforgiving Iraqi political system and
then maintain himself in power.
Additionally, Saddam’s suspected hatred for
Kuwaitis was further reflected in his decision to return
all Western and Saudi prisoners of war under the
provisions of the 1991 ceasefire, while claiming that
Iraq was unable to account for a number of Kuwaiti
prisoners.91 The Iraqis admitted taking prisoners from
Kuwait back to Iraq but claimed to have lost track of
them during the post-war Shi’ite uprising in southern
Iraq.92 Later, after Saddam was ousted in April 2003,
the remains of around 250 Kuwaitis were recovered
at various sites in Iraq. Post-mortems established that
they had been the victims of summary execution by
being shot in the head.93 The search for the remains of
other captives has continued since that time, but the
Kuwaitis have suggested that they are disappointed
with the results of this effort.94
After the war, Kuwaitis were deeply disappointed
that Saddam managed to continue in power despite
several apparently serious attempts by Iraqi military
officers to overthrow him in the early 1990s.95 UN
sanctions were maintained on the regime from 199032

2003, and the regime was treated as an international
outcast by a number of states throughout that time.
Later, in 1995, military officers affiliated with the
large and important Dulaim tribal federation revolted
against Saddam’s rule, but the dictator was able the
suppress the uprising and executed 120-130 officers
associated with it.96
The Evolution of the Kuwaiti Military
and Its Capabilities.
The 1990 Iraqi invasion left an indelible mark on
Kuwaiti attitudes about the country’s vulnerability. It
led the Kuwaitis to conclude a 1991 military security
agreement with the United States and defense
cooperation agreements with a number of other
powerful countries. It also led to an effort to expand
and improve the Kuwaiti military. Yet, Kuwait has
faced and will continue to face a number of difficulties
with national defense. As a small nation with a limited
citizen population, the Kuwaitis have often had serious
problems maintaining a formidable military that can
serve as even a partial deterrent to the country’s larger
neighbors. This has created something of a cycle in
Kuwaiti attitudes toward national security issues. In
times of crisis or a looming threat, Kuwait has expanded
its military, although it has never been strong enough
to deter or defeat aggression from a major regional
power without significant outside help. Until the
1990 invasion, Kuwait preferred to address national
security threats through diplomacy and efforts to play
off rival powers against each other. It did not take the
route of attempting to transform itself into a small but
well-armed and mobilized society (such as Israel or
Cuba) that could exact a costly price on any potential
invader.
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The Kuwaiti leadership also had important
reasons for opposing a strong military even if it was
able to overcome the structural problems inhibiting
such development. In this regard, Kuwait became
independent at a time when several key Arab
monarchies had recently been overthrown by military
coups. Egypt’s King Farouk had been ousted by a “free
officers” coup in 1952, and the Hashemite monarchy
in Iraq had been overthrown in 1958. Jordan managed
to put down several nearly successful coup attempts,
and many commentators at that time assumed that the
Jordanian monarchy’s chances for survival were poor.97
In this environment, the idea of becoming an Arab
Sparta, always anathema to Kuwaitis, seemed even
more unacceptable. Whether because of these concerns
or for other reasons, Kuwait is not known to have ever
faced a serious military coup attempt throughout its
history. Expansion of the military and a more forceful
mobilization of the society for war clearly had its
threatening aspects for the Kuwaiti leadership as well
as for the population.
Ongoing attempts to improve military capabilities
did, of course, exist despite Kuwaitis’ understandable
lack of interest in a militarized society. In 1969 Kuwait
began defense cooperation with France, including a
number of significant contracts for military equipment
and weapons. These included small arms; artillery; and
Gazelle, Puma, and Super Puma helicopters.98 Manpower
problems remained a constant concern during this time
frame, and enlisted ranks were impossible to fill without
noncitizen bidoon and foreign Arab soldiers, including
Palestinians. In 1978 Kuwait moved to strengthen
its army by introducing conscription, which lasted
in various forms until it was indefinitely suspended
in the 1990s.99 Young Kuwaiti males were supposed
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to serve 2 years in the military, except for university
students who were slated to serve 1 year. The practice
was introduced because the Kuwaiti military could
not support its manpower needs through volunteers,
although so many Kuwaitis obtained exemptions that
conscription was reduced to a hollow shell.100 A variety
of other opportunities, especially commercial ones,
make a military career less appealing than it would be
in other societies. Moreover, prior to the 1990 invasion,
Kuwait’s military was composed of about 12,000
personnel. Saddam had a million-man battle-hardened
military.
The Kuwaiti Armed Forces never had a chance
against the large columns of invading Iraqi troops.
Kuwaiti forces were not organized well for defense
and were quickly overwhelmed by massive numbers
of Iraqi troops. Some instances of especially heroic
resistance, nevertheless, did occur, particularly among
combat aircraft pilots who bombed the advancing
Iraqi forces, and in some cases were shot down
resisting the invaders.101 Likewise, a Kuwaiti armored
brigade fought very well near the Jahra’ ridge.102 Later,
as it became important for government legitimacy
and public relations to suggest to the world that the
Kuwaiti military had made a decent stand against
the invaders, the reported valor of the emir’s halfbrother, Sheikh Fahd al Ahmad, became significant.
Sheikh Fahd was the commander of an elite airborne
regiment who stayed behind to lead his unit and
was subsequently killed in battle.103 Extremely heroic
accounts of his last days and hours have emerged as
recounted by an Iraqi deserter who claims to have been
an eye witness. This ex-soldier claims that the Sheikh
led his soldiers gallantly against the much larger force
of Iraqis and personally killed several enemy soldiers.
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Many Kuwaitis emphatically believe this story and are
inspired by it, while others have expressed doubt.104
Clearly, this is “how Kuwait’s leaders and defenders
ought to have acted,” but beyond that, events become
very difficult to verify.105
After liberation by a U.S.-led international coalition
in 1991, the Kuwaitis had to develop a new approach
to national security that addressed many of the same
problems that they had encountered in the pre-war era
and now included an array of additional difficulties.
While the Kuwaitis did not plan or expect to defend
their country alone, they nevertheless needed to make
it clear they would do their share of the fighting in
any future conflict as an important part of alliance
maintenance. Thus, Kuwait faced the task of rebuilding
its army and air force to the point that it could
contribute more effectively to the national defense of
the country. In doing so, the Kuwaitis did not wish to
be seen as asking their allies to make sacrifices that they
were unprepared to make themselves. Additionally,
rebuilding and improving the Kuwaiti military after
the war was a staggering challenge. Kuwait’s wartime
losses complicated the pre-war readiness problems
associated with limited human resources. Kuwait’s
military infrastructure was intensively bombed by
coalition forces during the war since Iraqi troops were
using Kuwaiti bases.106
Kuwaiti military rebuilding goals were exceptionally ambitious, especially given the staggering nature
of their wartime losses. The bulk of Kuwait’s weapons
and military equipment were lost, destroyed, or stolen
driving the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath. Some
combat aircraft and limited supplies of land forces
equipment were saved in the retreat to Saudi Arabia.
Otherwise, the Kuwaitis were essentially starting
36

over in efforts to equip their forces. Military spending
went from 12 percent of the national budget to 42
percent in the first year after liberation.107 While this
dramatic jump reflected “start-up costs” and was not
sustained, it signaled Kuwait’s commitment to build
a military that could much more effectively defend
against Iraqi aggression than had been seen in 1990.
In September 1991 the Kuwaitis signed a contract
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to rebuild and
upgrade Ali al Salim and Ahmed al Jaber air bases, two
major military installations that had been extensively
damaged. The Kuwaitis also engaged in a massive
military purchasing drive including hundreds of U.S.built M1A2 Abrams tanks and 40 F-18 Hornet aircraft
to serve as the backbone of their new air force. The
first batch of six F-18 Hornet aircraft arrived in January
1992. In early 1992, Kuwait also purchased a number
of U.S.-built air defense systems, including both Hawk
and Patriot missile systems.108 The Kuwaitis further
engaged in extensive joint training with a number of
allies, including the United States, as a way of helping
to ensure broad-based political support for Kuwait
in any future confrontation.109 Defense cooperation
agreements were signed with France in 1991, the
UK in 1992, Russia in 1993, and China in 1994. All of
these have been renewed as necessary to keep them
in force. These agreements involve the sale of military
equipment to Kuwait, joint military exercises, and
other forms of military cooperation.
Continuing problems with Iraq following 1991
also encouraged Kuwaiti military spending. Elements
of the Iraqi military, for example, repeatedly crossed
the Kuwaiti border in the first year after Operation
DESERT STORM to forage for some of their own
abandoned equipment left on the battlefield. Since UN
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sanctions prohibited the purchase of new and modern
equipment and smuggling could not make up for this
loss in militarily significant quantities, foraging became
a marginally useful supplemental stopgap measure
for maintaining the vastly reduced Iraqi military. The
Kuwaitis dealt with this problem by building a security
fence along the border with Iraq in the immediate
aftermath of the UN’s official demarcation of the
border.110 More serious problems with the Iraqis were
still to come.
In April 1993 former President George H. W. Bush
made a ceremonial visit to Kuwait to commemorate
the coalition victory in the 1991 war. Shortly after
the event, the Kuwaiti government announced that
Iraqi intelligence had plotted to assassinate President
Bush during his trip and that 13 Iraqi agents had
been arrested. The forensics of the explosives have
been described as suggesting Iraqi involvement.111
President Clinton retaliated against the Iraqis by
firing 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles against military
and security targets in Baghdad on June 26, 1993. The
assassination story is, nevertheless, doubted by some
experts who suggest that the Iraqis may have been
apprehended during routine smuggling and framed
with planted explosives.112 Some authors have further
challenged the authenticity of the information on the
assassination provided by the Kuwaitis.113 The motives
for the Kuwaiti police to undertake such an operation
are uncertain unless the Kuwaiti leadership believed
the United States, under President Clinton, was losing
interest in forcefully addressing Iraq-related issues. In
any event, U.S. and Kuwaiti concerns about Saddam
remained high after the incident. Another equally
chilling military confrontation occurred in October
1994 when the United States was required to rush troops
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to Kuwait in response to Saddam’s decision to move
a two division Republican Guard force toward the
Kuwaiti border with the apparent aim of undermining
the sanctions regime directed at Iraq.114 While this
effort was unsuccessful in achieving Saddam’s goals,
it deeply alarmed both the Kuwaitis and the United
States.
As the problems with Iraq continued, the effort
to rebuild and upgrade Kuwaiti defenses proved to
be much more difficult than first had been expected.
Kuwait’s revenue flow was initially disrupted by the
need to repair the nation’s oil infrastructure and pay
for a variety of costs associated with the 1991 Gulf
war. These problems were partially dealt with through
Kuwaiti funds deposited in foreign banks, investment
income, and loans. Some purchases were also delayed
by differences between the Sabah family government
and the parliament. These disagreements centered
on the parliament’s demands for a more transparent
military purchasing procedure. Clearly, some members
of parliament believed there was considerable
corruption in the conduct of military purchases which
involved billions of dollars.115
The Kuwaiti military rebuilding effort therefore
went forward but took time. The effort at military
rehabilitation was also backed by the Desert Spring
series of training exercises which defense writer Michael
Knights describes as maturing in the late 1990s.116
Kuwaiti military purchasing programs continued
throughout this time frame, but the levels at which they
could be supported were vulnerable to fluctuations in
the international oil market. The “Intrinsic Action”
exercise rotations of U.S. combat forces into Kuwait
also provided valuable joint training and interface as
well as deterrent value.
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The George W. Bush administration further
designated Kuwait a major U.S. non-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) ally on April 1, 2004. Part
of the reason for this change in status may have been
to show appreciation for Kuwaiti support during the
invasion of Iraq. The value of this designation includes
expedited delivery of military equipment and more
favorable purchasing arrangements.117 The Kuwaitis
continue to support U.S. and coalition operations in
Iraq. The large and impressive Camp Arifjan is about
40 miles south of Kuwait City and has replaced Camp
Doha as the center of U.S. military activity in Kuwait.118
The current defense pact with the United States runs
until 2012 and is expected to be renewed at that time.
The Kuwaiti army currently has around 11,000
personnel, and the air force has about 2,500, according
to the London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies.119 The Navy has 10 patrol and coastal craft, and
there are also 23,000 reservists for all services. There
are 6,600 paramilitary Kuwaiti National Guard forces.
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid al Rodhan note
that although Kuwaiti’s armed forces remain small,
training and military readiness are taken seriously, and
training is effective at the brigade and squadron level.120
According to Cordesman and Rodhan, at least two of
the Kuwaiti Army brigades are capable of deploying
with the full equipment set, although logistical
support becomes problematic if they deploy far from
their home bases in Kuwait. Military procurement
and upgrading also continues, although it has slowed
dramatically over the last few years. In 2006 Kuwait
purchased 24 Apache Longbow attack helicopters, which
they began receiving in November.121 The Kuwaitis
are also planning to select a builder in 2008 for two
fast attack boats in an agreement that is expected to be
worth around $350 million.122
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The End of the Saddam Hussein Regime
and Legacies of the Sanctions Years.
It is safe to say that of all of the Arab nations,
Kuwait was clearly the most supportive of U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was largely launched
from Kuwait. Kuwaitis continued to live in fear of Iraq
even though Saddam was contained by “no-fly” zones
and economic sanctions after the Gulf war of 1991.
When asked in 2000 if Kuwaitis still felt threatened
by Saddam, Kuwait Defense Minister Sheikh Salem al
Sabah asserted, “Yes, we do; yes, we do; yes, we do.
It is built into the [Iraqi] mind and their thoughts that
Kuwait is a part of Iraq, and Kuwait being rich and more
advanced, with technologies and what have you, they
feel jealous from it. And they will keep threatening the
Kuwaiti security.”123 Interestingly, Defense Minister
Sabah did not limit his assertions merely to Saddam’s
mind. He spoke of Iraqis in general terms. These types
of statements are not surprising given the history of
Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations that have already been noted in
this text, but it is also noteworthy that the Iraq education
system from 1990 onward emphasized the Iraqi claim
to the ownership of Kuwait.124 Maps of Iraq used for
“educational” purposes did not acknowledge Kuwait
as an independent country.125 While these materials are
no longer used, a large number of Iraqi students were
exposed to exceptionally crude propaganda about
Kuwait for a number of years.
Kuwaitis consequently viewed the possible U.S.
removal of Saddam from power with a great deal of
interest. Officially, the Kuwaiti government maintained
that it would not take part in the 2003 fighting unless
Iraqi forces threatened Kuwaiti territory.126 They were,
however, willing to provide indispensable support
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for the U.S. build-up prior to the war, stating that this
activity was based on a UN Security Council Resolution
and was therefore both legal and important. 127 The
Kuwaitis also closed off at least one-third of their
territory for assembly and training areas for the U.S.led coalition. Kuwait further provided base support
and supplies to the coalition forces including food, fuel,
and laundry services.128 In allowing the United States
this sort of latitude, Kuwait opened itself to criticism
from elsewhere in the Arab World. Many Kuwaitis,
however, were deeply encouraged by the prospect of
ridding themselves of their deadliest enemy.
The leadership maintained that Kuwaiti military
forces would contribute directly to what they called
the “Iraq Liberation War” by defending their own
territory and helping Iraqi civilian refugees in southern
Iraq, while keeping them out of Kuwaiti territory.129
Kuwaitis also maintained that, by helping the United
States, they were in fact helping the Iraqi people
oppressed by Saddam.130 Moreover, many Kuwaitis
thought that they might be attacked by missiles with
chemical or even biological warheads. During the war,
Kuwaiti Patriot missile units appear to have shot down
a number of Iraqi missiles fired at their country.131 These
Iraqi systems were probably Silkworm and al Samood
missiles, which could easily have been fired into Kuwait
from Iraq. All of these Iraqi systems had conventional
warheads, but the strikes strongly vindicated the
decision to acquire the Patriot system from the United
States. Additionally, U.S. Patriot batteries stationed in
Kuwait (and especially near U.S. military assembly
areas) provided a great deal of additional support in
defending Kuwaiti airspace.132
The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime
created the potential for a new and positive set of
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relationships between Iraq and Kuwait. Nevertheless,
as discussed earlier, Kuwait and Iraq have an
extremely troubled history that pre-dates not only
the Iraqi invasion in 1990, but even Kuwait’s formal
independence in 1961. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship
was thoroughly poisoned by Saddam’s 1990 invasion
and remained frozen without any serious potential to
improve until Saddam’s removal in 2003. His arrest
and imprisonment were extremely popular in Kuwait,
and his conviction by an Iraqi court was cause for
celebration by many Kuwaitis.133 One Kuwaiti member
of parliament stated that no other verdict was possible.134
Other Kuwaiti legislators sought to withdraw economic
aid from regional countries that criticized the conduct
of Saddam’s execution for sectarian chanting and
other procedural irregularities.135 This policy was not
actually implemented, but the anger expressed in the
parliament was genuine and searing.136 Nevertheless,
Saddam’s conviction and execution has not ended
Kuwaiti concerns about Iraq, regardless of whether
it emerges as an intact nation or is instead reduced to
ongoing civil war and anarchy.
A key factor influencing ongoing problems
remains the legacy of UN sanctions imposed on Iraq
between 1990 and 2003. While Kuwaitis remember
the occupation of their country with horror and fear,
Iraqis view the era of sanctions as a continuation
of their own national nightmare. In the 1970s, Iraq
had a steadily rising standard of living due to its oil
wealth, and many Iraqis hoped for a prosperous
future that approached that of the small oil-rich Gulf
States, including Kuwait.137 The Iran-Iraq War and the
1991 Gulf war ended these dreams and the chance of
recovering even to the economic level of the 1970s was
foreclosed after the war due to UN sanctions. Kuwait
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was seen by some Iraqis as having a significant role
in the maintenance of these sanctions, perhaps for the
sake of spite and revenge as well as national security.138
Kuwait strongly denied that it held any animosity
towards the Iraqi population. In a 1999 interview,
Kuwaiti Defense Minister Salim al Sabah stated, “We
stand with the Iraqi people and their right to live, and
we oppose the attempt to starve them . . . What we are
against is the Saddamite clique, not the Iraqi people.”139
This is virtually identical to the U.S. position over these
years, but the U.S. position on sanctions was anathema
to Iraqis and was also unpopular throughout the
wider region. Almost no Iraqi citizens approved of the
sanctions which impoverished them, even though the
purpose of these measures was to oust Saddam.
Regardless of the reasons for its actions, Kuwait
appeared to be an important force in maintaining the
sanctions. During the years between 1991 and 2003,
Kuwait went forward with a serious diplomatic effort
to support UN sanctions against Iraq and to isolate
Iraq politically and economically. While Kuwait is a
small country, it advocated the isolation of Saddam’s
Iraq as a central feature of its foreign policy and
viewed any effort to rehabilitate the Iraqi image as
morally and strategically unacceptable. This situation
is not surprising since Saddam continued to evoke
fear among Kuwaitis. Furthermore, the Iraqi dictator
periodically renewed his threats against Kuwait such
as in late 2000, when Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing
Iraqi oil in border areas. This accusation was disturbing
in Kuwait since the same charge was raised shortly
before the 1990 invasion.140
The Kuwaitis also attempted to improve relations
with Saddam’s former allies (such as Jordan and
Yemen) in the mid-1990s in an effort to keep Iraq
44

isolated and ensure that Saddam could not reach out
to the same countries in a future regional crisis. The
U.S.-Kuwaiti struggle to isolate Iraq nevertheless faced
considerable regional opposition. Most Arab states
and publics considered UN sanctions to be excessive
and unfairly punishing to the Iraqi people more than
the Iraqi regime.141 Like the United States, Kuwait did
not always appear to find this distinction valuable, and
many Kuwaitis may have felt that all Iraqis were not
simply the innocent victims of the Saddam regime.
Moreover, the Iraqi government stressed to its public
that the sanctions impoverishing them were advocated
and enabled by Kuwait.142 After the December 1998
Operation DESERT FOX air raids against Iraq,
Saddam’s puppet parliament stated that it held Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia “fully responsible” for the U.S. and
British attacks since these air strikes were launched
from their territory.143
During the sanctions years, the issue of the IraqKuwait border again became important, and a special
UN Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
was established to seek clarification of this issue.
The commission issued its final report on May 20,
1993, noting that the original border markings had
disappeared, and that Iraqi farmers had expanded
their date farms beyond the old border in a way that
caused Iraq to intrude into Kuwaiti territory.144 The
revised border offered Kuwait some important new
advantages, while creating additional problems for Iraq.
The adjusted boundary gave Kuwait increased control
over the Rumalia and Ratga oil field, while reducing
Iraqi access to the port facilities at their city of Umm
Qasr. Saddam’s government, not surprisingly, was livid
at the time, but there was nothing Baghdad could do to
alter the situation. Under severe international pressure,
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Iraq accepted the border modification. Since that time,
the Kuwait leadership has stated that it views the 1993
demarcation as final, and it will therefore refuse to
enter into new border discussions with Iraq.145
Following Saddam’s ouster, Kuwait was not in an
apparent hurry to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Iraq, and relations with post-Saddam governments have
not been without problems. In July 2005, the Kuwaiti
government agreed to allow the establishment of an
Iraqi embassy in Kuwait, but only when pressed to do
by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.146 Kuwait does not yet
have an ambassador in Baghdad, and appears reluctant
to appoint one until larger Arab states set a precedent
and violence in that city declines significantly. At the
time of this writing, no Arab state except Jordan is
represented in Baghdad at the ambassadorial level.
Iran, conversely, appointed an ambassador in May
2006.147 Some Kuwaiti business leaders were previously
reported to be eager to reopen trade with post-Saddam
Iraq, but ongoing violence makes that impossible and
interest has subsequently faded.148
The issue of debt also continues to divide Iraq and
Kuwait. In early 2004, Kuwait told U.S. special envoy
James A. Baker III that it would forgive a substantial
amount of the $25 billon owed to Kuwait, but many
Iraqis feel that Kuwait has yet to offer them a generous
settlement of debts incurred during Saddam’s regime.149
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and numerous other Iraqi
leaders have expressed public disappointment that
Kuwaitis are not prepared to be more forgiving in their
approach to debt resulting from Saddam Hussein’s
years of misrule. The Kuwaiti government, in contrast,
noted that while some Iraqi debts acquired during
the Iran-Iraq War will be written off, debt forgiveness
will not include reparations which Iraq is still to pay
46

as a result of the 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait.150 The
Kuwaitis are particularly adamant that the families
of those killed or missing in the 1990-91 invasion and
occupation must be compensated.151
In even more striking contrast to the Iraqi requests
for debt forgiveness, some Kuwaiti members of parliament have objected to the generosity of their government’s current policy on this issue and have suggested
that Iraq should pay its entire debt in a timely manner.152
This is not a realistic proposal due to the sectarian crisis
in Iraq and the existence of numerous Iraqi priorities
higher than debt repayment. It is even possible that at
some point the Kuwaitis will again consider aid to Iraq
if they feel that this is being done in conjunction with
other wealthy states and has a reasonable chance of
helping to stabilize Iraq. Nevertheless, the unresolved
anger with Iraq remains and will influence any plan
to ease Iraqi financial difficulties. Moreover, there are
other budget priorities of interest to various Kuwaiti
constituencies that government leaders will also
have to consider. Military leaders, for example, have
suggested that they would like a larger budget to
be used in “refurbishing the army.”153 Of even more
interest are various schemes to provide cash awards
or pay off the bank loans of Kuwaiti citizens. There
are also proposals to raise the salaries of government
employees who comprise the majority of the Kuwaiti
citizen workforce. Debt forgiveness or aid to Iraq is
not particularly popular when matched against these
programs.154
Iraq’s new leaders have publicly renounced the idea
that Kuwait is part of Iraq, but sometimes they have
done this in the ways that concern Kuwaitis. In July
2005, Iraq’s then National Security Advisor Muwaffaq
al Rubei stated:
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The fascist Ba’athist ideology of the past era fed the
thought that Kuwait is part of Iraq. I admit that there
are still some who have been influenced with the
propaganda of the defunct regime and continue to
harbor this thought in their minds. Therefore, we in Iraq
and Kuwait have to work together to foster the idea of
twining and integration between the two countries and
nurture Kuwait’s pioneer role in the reconstruction of
Iraq because this is the only way to debunk this idea.155

Such statements seem more like a veiled threat about
the need for Kuwaiti aid for Iraq than a final renunciation of territorial claims to Kuwait.
Adding to current problems, the end of Saddam
Hussein’s regime did not lead to a resolution of
many of the outstanding problems between Iraq and
Kuwait.156 Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, for example,
has been a critic of the current Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, as
have other leading figures in the Iraqi government.157
Maliki suggests that the border was adjusted in 1993
as a way of punishing the Saddam regime, and that
the original reason for the adjustment no longer exists.
Now that Saddam has been executed, the border
should be renegotiated in Iraq’s favor. While there is
a certain logic to Maliki’s arguments, this is a familiar
and disconcerting line of reasoning to most Kuwaitis.
To some, Maliki looks like one more in a long line of
Iraqi leaders casting envious eyes on Kuwaiti territory.
The reassuring thing about Maliki for Kuwaitis is that
he is not in a position to press for border changes.
At the time of this writing, Kuwait is clearly safe
from an Iraqi conventional military attack even without
the U.S. alliance. The Bagdad government is currently
unable to control its own capital and is certainly not
in a position to undertake foreign military adventures.
The Iraqi Army is weak and divided, and the Iraqi
Air Force has very little offensive capability (beyond
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a few helicopters).158 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis are
psychologically unable to rule out a future threat
from Iraq. The current Iraqi political system is widely
viewed in Kuwait and the world as transitional,
and it is not impossible that a strong and dictatorial
government will once again emerge. This may occur
only after a prolonged civil war in which a victor
emerges and consolidates power. While Iraq is in
turmoil now, it may eventually become much stronger.
Moreover, if the future of Iraq is defined by intense
and protracted civil war, the parties left standing are
likely to be radical, militarized, and inclined to violent
confrontation. Radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr,
for example, is a strong Iraqi nationalist who could
conceivably threaten Kuwait in the future, although
he would almost certainly be deterred from a direct
conventional invasion. Sadr has called upon Kuwait to
end its relationship with the United States and evict the
U.S. troops currently in that country on the grounds
that they are no longer necessary to protect the emirate
from Saddam.159
Kuwaiti Concerns about Iraqi Insurgency
and Sectarian Warfare.
The Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003,
introduced a major new element into the U.S.-Kuwaiti
strategic relationship in which both parties retain a
stake. Despite overwhelming Kuwaiti enthusiasm for
Saddam’s ouster, some Kuwaitis for a considerable time
have blamed the United States for what they describe
as a mismanaged occupation.160 This blame is often
private, and some Kuwaitis also temper it with a belief
that Iraq is an inherently violent society that is almost
impossible to rehabilitate. Additionally, the Kuwaiti
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leadership has been especially reluctant to criticize
the United States in public on this issue. In 2004, for
example, Speaker of the Parliament Jasem al Kharafi
responded to Kuwaiti public criticisms of U.S. actions
in Falluja by calling upon citizens “to stay out of other
states’ business to spare [Kuwait] unwarranted and
uncalled for tensions and confrontations.”161 Kuwaiti
leaders did, however, feel compelled to speak out in the
aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal.162 Saddam had
previously held a number of Kuwaitis at the prison,
leaving Kuwaitis especially sensitive about human
rights abuses there.
In Kuwait fear is increasing that the United States
will leave Iraq in anarchy due to domestic political
pressure, and Iraq will subsequently devolve into a
large and uncontrollable civil war.163 According to a
November 30, 2006, statement by the emir, “Under the
current circumstances, an American withdrawal would
not help at all in bringing back stability [to Iraq]. On
the contrary, the situation would get worse, and we
would be looking at a very intense civil war.”164 This
concern has been reiterated at various other meetings
of Kuwaitis and U.S. officials.165 The Kuwaitis have also
publicly supported President Bush’s “surge” option
into Baghdad, although they have also indicated that
they would like to see the United States open a dialogue
on Iraq with all regional powers including Iran and
Syria.166
The Kuwaiti government is also seriously concerned
about an Iraqi refugee crisis should the United States
leave that country and an uncontrolled civil war
break out. While the Kuwaiti border is fenced and
provided with a number of security measures, it is not
unbreachable. This problem is especially serious since
Kuwait is a small country unable to absorb or provide
facilities for large numbers of Iraqi citizens within
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its borders. Thus, the Kuwaitis are not expected to
allow refugee camps within Kuwait but would under
proper circumstances support the administration of
Iraqi refugee camps outside Kuwaiti borders. This
effort would probably be conducted in collaboration
with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that
are concerned about Iraqi refugees, including Saudi
Arabia.167 Kuwaitis also worry that large numbers
of refugees on their borders could lead to increased
problems with crime and especially smuggling arms
and drugs either by land or sea.
Some would-be insurgents from outside Iraq have
coordinated with a handful of radicals from the fringes
of Kuwaiti society. These Kuwaiti extremists helped
them infiltrate into Iraq and, to the extent possible,
provided them with money and logistical support.
One radical group that has been identified as active in
facilitating the movement of terrorists into Iraq calls
itself the “Kuwait Mujahideen.” This group may be
affiliated with al-Qai’da but does not appear to be
engaged in terrorist operations within Kuwait. Another
group, the “Peninsula Lions,” has previously attacked
targets within Kuwait, and some scholars speculate
there may have been a “division of labor” between the
two groups. Many of the Peninsula Lions were arrested
or killed in January 2005, and it is possible that the
group has been largely wiped out.168
Another set of problems can be seen on the internet.
Iraqi insurgents using jihadist websites have sometimes
specifically threatened Kuwait and Kuwaitis inside
Iraq.169 These threats are increasingly irrelevant since
very few Kuwaitis are currently interested in traveling
to Iraq. Threats against Kuwait itself are another matter.
In this regard, many Kuwaitis are extremely worried
about the claim that Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as
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the chief training ground for the next generation of
“professionalized” terrorists.170 In particular, a danger
is that radical Kuwaitis who infiltrate into Iraq will
then return and apply their terrorist skills against the
Kuwaiti government and society.171 Such a situation
would recreate the problems that Saudi Arabia
and other Arab states had in coping with returning
veterans from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.
These individuals in many cases were both radicalized
and professionalized with a variety of military and
terrorist skills. Currently, there are believed to be
about 120 Kuwaitis who participated in the SovietAfghan war living at home in Kuwait.172 A handful
of Kuwaitis have also participated in various other
Islamic military causes such as the wars in Bosnia and
Chechnya. All of these individuals are believed to be
under surveillance, and they currently present no clear
threat to the Kuwaiti government.173 An uncontrolled
civil war in Iraq’s near future could change everything.
Such a conflict would attract much more serious
attention from Kuwait’s radical fringe, and present
a significantly less manageable problem for Kuwait
authorities once these radicals begin returning home.
Many Kuwaitis also fear a possible spillover of
Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian warfare from Iraq through the
incitement of intercommunal hatreds within Kuwait.
In his opening address to Parliament in October 2006,
Emir Sheikh Sabah al Ahmed urged his people to put
aside any sectarian differences that could endanger
Kuwait security. The emir asserted that, “Kuwait
does not belong to one group only or to one sect only,
it is for everybody.”174 He further urged Kuwaitis to
shun “any behavior that results in division.”175 These
statements were widely interpreted as a renunciation
of divisiveness over sectarian issues. In Kuwait, unlike
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Iraq, members of the two sects seldom intermarry, and
the major Kuwaiti tribes do not include a mix of Sunnis
and Shi’ites in their ranks.176 Moreover, the Kuwaiti
government is concerned that it will not be able to
generate an Iraq policy that would please both Sunni
and Shi’ite Kuwaitis during a full scale Iraqi civil war.
Conservative Kuwaiti Sunnis, including Wahhabis,
have serious doctrinal differences with Shi’ites and
would find themselves deeply concerned about a Shi’ite
government in Iraq in general and especially concerned
about one that actively and perhaps brutally imposes its
authority on Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Conversely, Kuwaiti
Shi’ites are also deeply interested in the welfare of the
Shi’ite community in Iraq. Many Kuwaiti Shi’ites view
Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani as their maraja-e
taqlid (source of emulation) for religious questions.177
The emir’s call for overcoming sectarian differences
has been echoed by other responsible individuals
and groups within Kuwaiti society. Additionally,
Abdulhadi al Saleh, minister of state for national
assembly affairs in early 2007, has been particularly
outspoken, speaking as both a Kuwaiti and a
Shi’ite.178 Kuwaiti women’s rights activists have also
urged vigilance against “abhorrent sectarian rifts.”179
Containing sectarian anger will nevertheless be a
challenge as problems in Iraq continue to provoke
international reactions. One Sunni Islamist member
of the Kuwaiti parliament, for example, accused the
Iranians of abetting the “sectarian liquidation” of Iraq’s
Sunni Muslims by Shi’ite militias.180 This statement,
which borders on an accusation of genocide, seems to
take a fairly one-sided view of the nature of the conflict
in Iraq. Should a large number of Kuwaiti citizens start
assigning exclusive blame for Iraq’s trouble on the
“other” Iraq sect, problems can be expected to develop
in Kuwaiti inter-community relations.
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On the positive side, Kuwait is often viewed as
having the best Sunni-Shi’ite relations of any Gulf
state, and Kuwaiti Shi’ites publicly acknowledge that
they are better off than their brethren elsewhere in the
Gulf.181 Shi’ites are free to practice most of their religious
rituals in public and to educate their children according
to Shi’ite religious precepts. They have also played an
important role in the Kuwaiti business sector, and a
number of Shi’ites have become extremely wealthy as
a result of their economic activities. This prosperity has
provided the Kuwaiti Shi’ites with a significant “stake
in the system” which helps to ensure their loyalty to
the state. Kuwaiti Shi’ites are also consistently elected
to the parliament, although not in the numbers that
might be expected as a result of their proportion of the
population. There is also a continuing effort to appoint
at least one Shi’ite minister to the government. Further,
many of the problems that developed between the two
Kuwaiti communities during the Iran-Iraq war were
quickly and decisively put to rest as a result of Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the unswerving Shi’ite loyalty
to their country. The Iraqi invasion and its aftermath
powerfully vindicated the Shi’ite distaste for the policy
of supporting Saddam in the conflict with Iran. While
the Shi’ites still have a long way to go before achieving
complete political equality, they nevertheless have a
great deal of encouragement to work within the system
so long as Kuwait does not adopt an Iraq policy that
they would view as completely one-sided in favor of
Iraq’s Sunnis.
Some Kuwaitis have suggested that a division of
Iraq may be an acceptable outcome. One prominent
Kuwaiti Sunni attorney has stated,
In terms of the division of Iraq and its impact on the
neighboring Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait and
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Saudi Arabia, I think it is in Kuwait’s strategic interests
for Iraq to remain weak . . . I am not worried about the
establishment of a Shiite state in southern Iraq on the
border with Kuwait because such a country would
not be strong enough to harm Kuwait, no matter how
influential Iran might be.182

There is a clear logic to this approach since another
conventional invasion is Kuwait’s greatest nightmare.
Yet, there is no evidence that this viewpoint has a
significant following, and it stands in contradiction to
official Kuwaiti policy. Moreover, other Kuwaitis have
suggested that a divided Iraq would further empower
Iran which would seek to dominate the Shi’ite rump
state in the south.183
Contemporary Political Differences
between Kuwait and the United States.
Although relations between the United States and
Kuwait remain strong, differences occasionally flare
over issues that are not related to Iraq, Iran, or Gulf
security. Recently this has involved Kuwaiti views
on Israeli and Palestinian issues. Kuwait, as has been
noted, was one of the strongest supporters of the rights
of the Palestinians prior to the 1990 invasion. Yassir
Arafat’s decision to side with Saddam in that crisis
was never forgiven by the majority of Kuwaitis, and
various Kuwaiti officials were sometimes criticized by
the Kuwaiti press for even speaking to Arafat in a civil
manner at international gatherings. Additionally, many
Palestinians living in Kuwait during the 1990 invasion
were widely viewed as supporting Saddam and Arafat,
although there were notable and heroic exceptions to
this approach. Either fairly or unfairly, Kuwaiti anger
against the Palestinians in the early 1990s was white
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hot, and almost all Palestinian workers were required
to leave the country.
Against this legacy of lingering distrust and anger the
Kuwaitis do evince some concern about the Palestinian
population. Young Kuwaitis do not remember all of
the problems of 1990-91 well and often tend to get a
lot of their information about Israeli-Palestinian issues
from Arab satellite television. Some such sources
include both the Israeli and Palestinian points of view,
and various Arab editorialists have criticized the
Qatar-based al Jazeera station for speaking to Israelis
and giving them large blocks of time to explain their
views and priorities.184 Nevertheless, a great deal of
extremely disturbing footage finds its way to these
cable programs, and the influence on young Gulf Arabs
is undeniable. An increasing number of Kuwaitis
are critical of U.S. support for Israel, although others
are more open to normalization with the Israelis.185
The official Kuwaiti policy is that they will not fully
normalize relations with the Israelis until a successful
settlement of the Palestinian issue occurs.
Serious differences with Kuwait have also
emerged over U.S. support for Israel’s summer 2006
confrontation with the Lebanese Hizballah. In protest
of U.S. support for Israel’s strikes into Lebanon,
hundreds of people rallied outside of the U.S. Embassy,
burned the U.S. flag, and demanded the expulsion of
the U.S. Ambassador. Chants of “Death to America”
were joined by a number of members of the Kuwaiti
parliament, and various speakers in the parliament
denounced the United States.186 There are a number of
reasons for this flare-up, including the anger of Shi’ite
Kuwaitis and Lebanese residents within Kuwait who
might feel special sympathy for the Lebanese Shi’ite
organization Hizballah. Such people appear to have
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led the demonstrations, and there would have been
considerable pressure on Kuwaiti Sunnis to show
solidarity with their Shi’ite countrymen. Nevertheless,
the Kuwaiti political culture seems to be growing less
tolerant of both U.S. and Israeli actions that threaten the
Palestinians or states bordering Israel. Additionally, the
Kuwaitis were apparently never tempted to mute their
criticism of Israel during the conflict because it was
attacking a Shi’ite enemy in Lebanon. Various other
Sunni-led states were viewed by the world press as
somewhat subdued in their criticism of Israel because
of their fear that a Hizballah victory would aggravate
an already difficult situation of advancing Shi’ite
power.187 Some Kuwaiti Sunni Islamists and others
have become more critical of Hizballah following the
end of the summer 2006 war with Israel.188
Another problem that has sometimes bothered
Kuwaitis is the perception that the United States does
not make a serious effort to consult them or their Gulf
neighbors on regional issues. Pique over this issue was
apparent in a remark by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister
Mohammad Sabah stating, “Yes we are allies of the U.S.
but we are not its puppies . . . . Our interests compel
transparency in delivering our concerns . . . and to
cooperate with the U.S. only where this is needed.”189
This demand for respect is especially compelling since
it comes from one of Kuwait’s most pro-American
political figures. The Kuwaitis have also made it clear
that they do not like to be harshly scolded by the
United States over such issues as the price of fuel for
the U.S. military. The Kuwaitis supplied free fuel to the
military during the 2003 war against Saddam, but did
request payment for some fuel at a preferential rate of
$21 per barrel as the conflict in Iraq continued. The U.S.
leadership agreed to pay $7 per barrel, but they did so
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only after the Kuwaiti leadership received a letter from
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) scolding them
for their ingratitude for the 1991 liberation.190 This
matter could have been settled satisfactorily without
such harshness which is often more painful when a
powerful state addresses a weaker ally, since it implies
a subordinate status relationship.
Other problems exist as well, including a past
tendency of some policymakers to stop in Kuwait on
the way to Iraq without spending any time there. This
approach has sometimes caused the Kuwaitis to feel
their views are not appreciated. Recently, significant
progress was made in reversing this perception when
the United States helped to organize a January 2007
conference with America’s Gulf allies (and Egypt and
Jordan) to discuss Iraq and Iraq-related problems.
The U.S. Secretary of State attended this conference
to present President Bush’s priorities and to listen to
the concerns of the attending Arab states. While some
disagreement occurred on the issue of Iran (discussed
later), all parties considered the discussions important,
and the value of these sorts of activities should not
be underestimated.191 Additionally, congressional
delegations are showing a much increased interest in
Kuwaiti opinions on regional security, probably as a
result of ongoing problems in Iraq. Previously, Kuwaitis
would at times become irritated at U.S. political leaders
who would call for a strategic redeployment of U.S.
forces from Iraq to Kuwait without any hint that the
Kuwaitis might seek input into such a matter.
Kuwait and Iran.
In addition to the United States and Iraq, Kuwait’s
interactions with Iran are especially significant. In
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the years following Kuwait’s 1991 liberation, there
was a strong effort to improve relations with Iran.
As a long-standing enemy of Saddam Hussein, Iran
seemed something of a natural ally to the traumatized
Kuwaitis in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion. Yet, the
working relationship between Kuwait and Tehran that
flourished after the 1991 liberation should not obscure
Iran’s previous role as a major source of concern for
Kuwait. Additionally, Iran’s revolutionary ideology
and political interest in dominating the Gulf are not
often seen as in Kuwaiti interests. The Kuwait-Iranian
relationship is therefore complex and nuanced and
must be understood within the context of a number of
recent historical events.
When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 igniting
the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait was initially interested in
maintaining strict neutrality. At the beginning of the
war and probably for some time afterwards, the Kuwaitis hoped that the two sides would exhaust each
other, and that neither would emerge as a strong vibrant
Gulf power in the wake of the other’s defeat.192 If Kuwait
backed a party that later lost the war, it feared facing
the wrath of an angry and militarily victorious enemy.
Strict neutrality seemed like an effective way to avoid
this problem. This thinking appears to have changed
in 1982 when it looked as though Iraq was in danger
of being overrun by the forces of an Iranian regime
euphoric over its battlefield victories. Additionally,
Kuwaiti leaders became especially concerned about the
increasing empowerment of Iranian revolutionary and
anti-monarchist ideology through military victory. The
Kuwaiti leadership thus reversed its earlier policies
and began tilting towards Iraq. As part of this initial
tilt, the government allowed the Kuwaiti media to take
a strong pro-Iraqi stand, while not allowing its officials
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to assert the same values in public.193 Later, the Kuwaiti
government provided Iraq with strong rhetorical,
financial, logistical, and diplomatic support. The GCC,
composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman, was formed in
1980 largely as a response to Iranian activism in the
Gulf after the 1979 Iranian revolution. It was during
this time when Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini
was most emphatic about Islam and monarchy being
incompatible.194
Kuwaiti leaders at this time also increasingly
feared that their Shi’ite citizens could be influenced
or manipulated by Iran. After the 1979 Iranian
revolution, Shi’ites in Kuwait were more assertive
about demanding equal rights, and some were viewed
by the government as receptive to the radical messages
of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As
noted, the two Kuwaiti religious communities tend to
live apart from each other in distinct areas, and this
lack of interaction may have increased intercommunal
suspicions.195 As the Kuwaiti leadership showed more
doubt about Shi’ite loyalty (resulting in employment
discrimination), the Shi’ites became vulnerable to
increased alienation from the system as a result of
government distrust.196 The previously close ties
between the al Sabah family and the Shi’ite merchant
class led the new policies to appear to some as a serious
disappointment to many Shi’ites. Discrimination
against Kuwaiti Shi’ites involved excluding many
of them from sensitive government positions. These
exclusions included not only defense and internal
security positions but also many jobs within the oil
industry which is Kuwait’s primary employer.197
Almost all of Kuwait’s Shi’ites chose not to respond
to the new situation with violence against their
government, but the Iranians were nevertheless able
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to unleash a wave of terrorism within Kuwait through
the use of proxies. This campaign was designed to
pressure Kuwait into renouncing pro-Iraqi policies.
Exiled members of the anti-Saddam Iraqi Dawa party
and Lebanese radicals in Kuwait apparently led this
campaign at the operational level. These individuals
had close ties to Iran and considerable experience in
setting up clandestine anti-government networks.
They were also able to recruit a few local Shi’ites and
bidoons to the cause. The Kuwaiti government wisely
did not pursue policies of wholesale persecution of
the Shi’ites, which the Iranians may have hoped to
provoke. They did, however, deport foreign Shi’ites
who had questionable pasts and increased surveillance
on the Shi’ite community as a whole.198
The Iranian-sponsored terrorist campaign was
waged within Kuwait from 1983 until 1989 with attacks
against a range of targets. On December 12, 1983,
pro-Iranian terrorists bombed the U.S. and French
embassies. Seventeen people were later convicted of
the bombing, which harmed Iranian relations with the
United States and France as well as Kuwait. In May
1985 an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life
of the emir by pro-Iranian Shi’ites who threw bombs
at his car. While the emir was not harmed, the attack
killed four other people including one bodyguard.199
Six weeks later two seaside resorts were bombed, and
at least 12 people were killed. Militants inspired by
Khomeini may have struck at these targets because
men and women were freely mixing at outdoor cafes.
In June 1986, saboteurs set explosive charges in oil
pipelines and at the head of a high-pressure oil well.
Subversion and terrorism in Kuwait also continued
following the cease-fire that ended the Iran-Iraq war in
August 1988, finally ending in 1989.200
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Nor were Iranian actions confined to the activities
of its terrorist surrogates. Iran’s military also attacked
Kuwaiti targets while either claiming the attacks were
Iraqi or that they were the result of battlefield mistakes
or miscalculations. In May 1984 Iran attacked and
damaged two Kuwaiti oil tankers and then denied
they had done so.201 As these problems continued,
Kuwait sought the reflagging of its ships as noted
earlier. There were also “accidental” Iranian bombing
strikes against Kuwaiti territory, although these were
not as serious as the attacks against tankers. The end
of the Iran-Iraq War removed the immediate cause
of conflict from Kuwaiti-Iranian relations, although
each side continued to view the other with the utmost
suspicion.
After the Iran-Iraq War, the Kuwaitis almost
certainly believed that Iran would not make an
acceptable ally and that its potential for political
extremism made it an undependable neighbor at best.
This outlook changed dramatically in August 1990
when virtually all Kuwaitis realized that Iran was not
their deadliest foe. At this time of crisis, Kuwaitis were
grateful for Iran’s neutrality in the emerging conflict
between the anti-Iraq coalition and the Baghdad regime
despite Saddam’s strong efforts to seek wider support
from Tehran by offering the Iranians a number of key
concessions. The Iraqi leader surrendered previously
touted Iraqi wartime gains including control of the Shatt
al Arab waterway. Tehran accepted Iraqi concessions
and formally reestablished diplomatic relations with
Iraq, but Iran did not side with Iraq in the conflict.
The Iranians did not issue the ferocious condemnations of the U.S. and coalition deployments to Saudi
Arabia, although that might have been expected given
their past history. Rather, they portrayed the operation
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as designed to “safeguard Arabia” in the face of Iraqi
threats.202 Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq
war, both Kuwait and Iran saw value in cooperating to
ensure the containment of Iraqi military power. During
the 1990s, Kuwait often appeared willing to overlook
Iranian ties to some Gulf terrorist groups because the
Kuwaitis did not want differences over these groups
to undermine relations with Tehran. Kuwait’s post1990 relations with Iran also follow the traditional
Kuwaiti approach of seeking to moderate potential
enemies through dialogue and economic interaction.
Kuwait hopes to use this approach to head off any
Iranian tendency to reinvigorate efforts to export
revolution such as occurred during the first years of
the Islamic Republic. This approach worked well
during the years in which Iranian President Khatami
sought to establish better relations with Iran’s regional
neighbors.203 The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
as president in 2005 made things more difficult since
he was both confrontational and a chauvinistic Iranian
nationalist. The Kuwaiti press has sometimes indicated
that Ahmadinejad treats the Gulf states with a lack
of respect, although they are aware that he and his
supporters do not control Iranian foreign and defense
policy.204
Kuwait remains unwilling to accept an ongoing
Iranian effort to establish a new regional security pact
in which Iran replaces the United States as the chief
protector of the Gulf Arab states. Iranian leaders have
stated that the Gulf Arabs have more in common
with the interests advocated by Tehran than those
advocated by the United States. The proposed Iranian
pact includes a provision whereby the Gulf states
would require the United States to leave bases within
their territory.205 It is consequently difficult for Kuwaiti63

Iranian relations to become cordial because of the U.S.Kuwaiti relationship.
The Iranians are extremely interested in ensuring
that Kuwait refuses to cooperate with any potential
U.S. plan to bomb or otherwise attack Iran. On an
April 2006 visit to Kuwait, former Iranian president
Rafsanjani stated, “We are certain the Gulf countries
will not back the United States in waging an attack
on Iran.”206 Various other Iranian leaders have also
reassured the public that the position of the Kuwaiti
government is that it will not allow its bases to be used
against Tehran for a military strike again their nuclear
facilities. Kuwaiti officials let these public statements
pass without direct comment, although they have
publicly stated their opposition to a U.S. attack on Iran.
It is not clear what they would do to try to prevent it or
to distance themselves from the United States if such
an attack occurs. Mostly, Kuwait spokesmen such as
Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem al Khorafi
have stressed that “[t]he region cannot bear the serious
consequences of military action.”207
Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known
to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest
in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are
also worried about appearing too confrontational
with Tehran.208 The concern about an Iranian nuclear
weapons capability is not surprising given that such
a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and
strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a
more assertive regional role with conventional and
unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do
not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they
are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is
a serious threat that may be employed more readily
if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from
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“regime change” by the United States.209 Moreover, the
Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States
is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti
security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq
war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other
Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their
concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without
implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the
central ways in which they have done this is to treat the
Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than
a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular,
they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would
have dramatic implications for their own countries if
massive amounts of radiation were released into the
atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence.210 The
Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination
plants which are their primary source of fresh water.
This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti
diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep
the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy
program is also a nuclear weapons program.
Not surprisingly, the Gulf states do not have
much ability to slow down the Iranian quest for
nuclear weapons. Some thought has been given to a
GCC declaration of a nuclear free zone in the region
in the hopes of pressuring Iran to renounce nuclear
technology, but this effort is unlikely to show the
slightest sign of success.211 Additionally, there is every
reason to believe that the Kuwaitis are sincere in
their public opposition to U.S. military strikes against
Iranian suspect facilities. Such an action would force
the Kuwaiti leadership to choose publicly between the
United States and Iran rather than to try to maintain
good ties with both states. While they would certainly
choose to maintain the U.S. alliance, Kuwaiti leaders
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would prefer not be presented with such a dilemma.
The Iranians could also find a variety of ways of retaliate
against Kuwait for hosting U.S. forces during a U.S.Iranian war.212 Kuwaiti national security analysts are
aware that a U.S.-Iranian war would have extremely
serious consequences for their country, including
possible Iranian missile attacks against U.S. military
forces on Kuwaiti soil.213 Thus, the Kuwaitis are without
any good options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear
weapons effort beyond continuing their current policy
of attempting to balance their relations with Iran and
the West.
Many Kuwaitis have also been concerned about the
Iranian role in post-Saddam Iraq.214 A recent response
to this concern was a January 16, 2007, Kuwaiti-hosted
Foreign Ministers Conference on Iraq which included
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as well as
representatives of the GCC states and Egypt and Jordan.
The conference issued a statement that expressed
support for the “principle of noninterference” in Iraq’s
internal affairs, as well as the need for “mutual respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
states” in the region.215 Kuwait Foreign Minister Sheikh
Mohammad al Sabah acknowledged to the press that
the joint statement was aimed at Iran.216 Nevertheless,
at that same conference the Kuwaitis encouraged the
United States to seek dialogue with both Iran and Syria
as recommended by the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study
Group.217 The Kuwaiti emir stated that dialogue with
both countries was important, and that a dialogue with
Iran was in the “interest of Gulf security in general.”218
Kuwaiti calls for U.S.-Iranian dialogue may be designed
to impress the Iranians with the potential of Kuwaiti
“good offices” as well as to seek to minimize tensions
between two countries that the Kuwaiti leadership
views as important to its future. Tehran has sometimes
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been reported to be interested in using the Arab
monarchies as an intermediary to help ease tensions
with Washington.219 Additionally, the Kuwaitis may
have sought to soften the appearance of siding with
the United States against Iran over the issue of Iraq in
the U.S./GCC/Egyptian/Jordanian joint statement.
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations may face an additional
challenge due to the changing nature of political
activity in Shi’ite-dominated southern Iraq. ProIranian political organizations are particularly strong
in this area which is geographically close to Kuwait.220
Further complicating the situation is the February
2007 British decision to drawdown their troops in Iraq,
seen by some as leading to the potential expansion
of Iranian influence in the area. This drawdown is
projected to lead to a near-term drop in the number
of British forces in and near Basra from 7,100 to 5,500,
and then possibly below 5,000 by the end of the year.221
The Iraqi government is expected to assume greater
responsibility as the British soldiers leave, but it is
unclear to the Kuwaitis that the Iraqis will measure
up to these new responsibilities.222 In response to such
concerns, Basra governor Muhammad al Wa’Ili has
stated that “our border with Kuwait is secure” and
noted that there is a “new plan” for border security with
Kuwait and other neighboring states.223 The Kuwaitis,
nevertheless, remain concerned about a more chaotic
situation in southern Iraq that may spillover into their
country.224 Kuwaitis also worry that Basra may become
a center of intense military combat should war break
out between the United States and Iran in the near
future. Such a scenario is continuously discussed in the
Middle East press regardless of how unlikely it may
appear to many Americans.
Another aspect of current Kuwaiti-Iranian relations is a vigorous outreach program by Tehran to
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present Kuwaiti citizens with its point of view on
a number of regional and international questions.
Tehran’s ambassador to Kuwait is Ali Jannati, the son
of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the hardline chairman
of Iran’s powerful Guardian’s Council.225 In Kuwait,
Ali Jannati speaks to the local press and strongly
maintains Tehran’s position that Sunni-Shi’ite troubles
in the region have been provoked by the United
States and Israel.226 He and others also continuously
reiterate that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons and
is helping resistance against the “crimes and atrocities
of the Zionist regime.”227 Both official and academic
Iranian speakers also address university audiences and
sometimes give presentations at Kuwaiti diwaniyas.228
Kuwait’s approach to education and politics often
encourages a variety of points of view and Iran’s actions
in this realm are only part of a much wider effort to
present large numbers of divergent views within these
sorts of forums.
The Terrorist Threat in Kuwait.
Kuwait has faced a number of dangers from
terrorism and subversion throughout its existence, as
has been noted earlier. Fears of Nasserite subversion
were taken seriously in the early days of Kuwaiti
independence, although the newly independent
government managed to play off Nasser and the Iraqis
to some extent. The Iranian-backed terrorist campaign
in the 1980s was another instance of a serious internal
security threat. Moreover, from 1991-2003 the Kuwaiti
intelligence services were especially concerned about
the dangers from Saddam Hussein’s agents. Now,
with Saddam gone, new threats have come to the
forefront of Kuwaiti concerns. Additionally, a small
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number of violent Kuwaiti extremists have engaged in
isolated and usually ineffective attacks on U.S. military
personnel in Kuwait. These actual and planned attacks
have occurred both before and after the U.S. invasion
of Iraq. In most cases, they appear to be the work of a
few disgruntled radicals rather than a highly organized
terrorist network. Most of the plots are broken up
prior to being implemented due to the amateurish
operational security of the would-be terrorists.229 A
few attacks have caused American injuries, and a U.S.
Marine was killed by terrorists on October 8, 2003, on
Faylaka Island.230
Kuwait may have been slow in recognizing an
internal Sunni extremist terrorist threat due to its
preoccupation with Saddam and a belief that Kuwait’s
democratic institutions would channel dissent in
nonviolent directions.231 Some informed observers have
suggested that Kuwaiti counterterrorism capabilities
have been slow to adapt to the new threat. Anthony
Cordesman and Khalid R. al Rodhan have stated
that Kuwait’s internal security apparatus largely has
the same force structure that it had in 1990, and the
Kuwaitis have a serious need to “start rethinking their
internal security apparatus.”232 The fact that Kuwait is a
small country is sometimes considered to give security
forces a counterterrorism advantage.
A few Kuwaitis became members of al-Qai’da
prior to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks and
participated in al-Qai’da operations outside of Kuwait
before the government fully realized the danger posed
by this organization.233 The spokesman for al-Qai’da,
Suleiman Abu Ghaith, was a native Kuwaiti citizen
until the government stripped him of his citizenship
in 2001 after he appeared on television threatening
Westerners with attack. As noted earlier, a limited
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number of Kuwaitis have fought for Islamic armed
groups in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia, and a
few Kuwaitis have been arrested in Afghanistan and
sent to Guantanamo Bay. Since the facility was created,
eight Kuwaitis have been returned to the emirate for
trial, with five cleared of all charges, one sentenced to
5 years in prison, and two awaiting trial at the time of
this report.234 Nevertheless, al-Qai’da does not seem to
have a presence in Kuwait, and other terrorists groups
that are similar to al-Qai’da appear weak and perhaps
broken. Kuwaiti security officials do an excellent job of
addressing security problems inside Kuwait, but it is
unclear that they are as closely focused on the activities
of Kuwaiti subversives outside their country.
Like much of the rest of the world, the 9/11
attacks jolted Kuwaitis into a new understanding of
the dangers of terrorism. This tragedy caused them
to reconsider some earlier and more worrisome
assessments of the threat. Some Kuwaitis and other
observers had previously expressed concern that
charitable donations might have been insufficiently
regulated in the years before the 9/11 strikes and
therefore found their way into the hands of terrorists.235
After 9/11, Kuwait enacted major new regulations
for banking and other financial transactions.236 The
Kuwaitis have frozen suspected terrorist funds, and
they cooperated with the UN finance watch list. The
Kuwaiti government has also established a ministerial
committee to revise and strengthen money laundering
laws and procedures and to criminalize the financing of
terrorism.237 The government also formed a ministerial
committee chaired by the Ministry of Awqaf and
Islamic Affairs in October 2004 to develop strategies
to confront terrorism and extremism. This committee
has developed an outreach program to encourage
70

moderation among Kuwaiti youth. It has further cocoordinated with the Ministry of Information to close
Kuwaiti-based internet sites that disseminate extremist
ideology.238 Nevertheless, both the United States and
Kuwaiti liberals continue to express concern about the
financial activities of radical Islamists. Liberals regard
the Islamists as brilliant opportunists who will take
advantage of any loopholes in the laws governing
financial transactions. U.S. State Department officials
have expressed concern about Kuwaiti radicals who
may carry large amounts of money out of the country
on their person and then distribute it as they see fit.239
In the aftermath of both the 9/11 attacks and a
series of attempted and actual attacks on U.S. troops,
the Kuwaitis announced in November 2002 that they
would “develop and modernize school curricula.”
Liberal Kuwaitis had consistently argued that this step
was necessary because rigid school textbooks on Islam
have partly contributed to the danger of extremism.240
The Kuwaitis might also have initiated such measures
because of a fear that their relationship with the United
States could be damaged if they were seen as tolerating
an extremist educational system. After 9/11, the
Kuwaitis had the opportunity to see a great deal of ugly
rhetoric being directed at Saudi Arabia by American
neoconservatives with numerous grievances against
the Saudi government. Such polemics also came from
elsewhere in the U.S. political spectrum as can be
seen in long and virulently anti-Saudi portions of the
American movie, “Fahrenheit 9/11.” Clearly Kuwait
did not want to be on the wrong side of the terrorism
or the democracy issue in ways that weakened or even
undermined the alliance with the United States, but it
also did not wish to alienate nonviolent, but very radical
members of Kuwaiti society. To this end, the Kuwaitis
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did not permanently close an important jihadist web
site that operated from their country.241
Moreover, Kuwaiti concerns about radicalism were
later given a boost by domestic events. In early 2005,
there was a serious spike in terrorist activity in Kuwait.
This began with a January 2005 clash in a Kuwait City
suburb between the security police and the Peninsula
Lions. The Kuwaitis responded forcefully to these
problems. Eight extremists were killed in a series of
gunfights with Kuwaiti authorities.242 The potential
dangers of the Lions may have been amplified by the
timing of the violence which occurred just as Saudi
Arabia was engaged in a major struggle against alQai’da forces waging war within the Kingdom.243
Furthermore, one of the militants killed in a January
15, 2006, gunbattle in Kuwait was a Saudi.244 This
gunfight was the first such attack in Kuwait that
involved a Saudi militant. Fortunately, the Peninsula
Lions have not shown much capacity for regenerating
their strength, and they may have been wiped out. No
large scale or spectacular terrorism has been evidenced
in Kuwait since that time, although poorly organized
plots by amateurs probably inspired by the internet
have occurred.
A little earlier, in December 16, 2005, Osama bin
Laden called for his supporters to attack oil installations
throughout the Gulf states as well as in Iraq.245 As of
early 2007, Kuwait leaders felt that they had good
reasons to remain deeply concerned about this threat.
The Kuwait press claimed in February 2007 that
friendly foreign Arab intelligence officials had warned
the government that Kuwait was considered a priority
target for al-Qai’da operatives seeking to strike at the
Gulf states as ordered by Osama bin Laden.246 This
reportedly was viewed “very seriously” by Kuwait’s
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Ministry of the Interior.247 Border penetration by land
or sea is also a serious concern of Kuwaiti authorities.248
Therefore this is hardly a time for Kuwaiti authorities
to become complacent about terrorism. Nevertheless,
small countries such as Kuwait may find it much
easier to establish security—especially since Kuwait is
wealthy enough to meet a variety of expensive security
tasks and has a manageable land mass and population
where it can apply anti-terrorist measures.
Political Tensions and Political Reform in Kuwait.
Kuwait’s tenuous but steady movement toward a
more democratic political system is not well-understood in the West, although it is important for the overall
process of Middle East democratization. According
to Mary Ann Tetreault, “Serious news about Kuwait
rarely penetrates far beyond the region in the best of
times. When the story is about democratization rather
than invasion or terrorism, even the most encouraging
news can evaporate without a trace.”249 In considering
Professor Tetreault’s critique, this problem frequently
tends to be a shortcoming of the Western media
rather than the U.S. Government. The media seems
unimpressed by slow, evolutionary changes despite
their importance. Unfortunately, these democratic
developments are not irreversible, and Kuwait could
still choose to go backwards rather than moving
forward to consolidate and expand reform.
It should also be noted that at least some Kuwaitis
view democratization as a national security as well
as a political development concern. Kuwait remains
interested in maintaining the backing and support of
the United States and other nonregional allies against
any regional states that might threaten it. These
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relationships may become vulnerable if Kuwait is
perceived as increasingly undemocratic. It has already
been noted that the more autocratic Saudi Arabia
has experienced tremendous U.S. public criticism in
recent years. Whatever the validity of many of the
complaints, they would have certainly been mitigated
by the existence of a Saudi parliament. Kuwait thus
has a strong advantage in reaching out to the United
States, but this advantage would vanish if Kuwait was
viewed by Americans and others as retreating from
democracy. Additionally, reform-minded Kuwaitis
are quick to point out that a stable, democratic system
in Kuwait serves to promote foreign investments.250
Increased foreign investment in Kuwait has political
as well as economic considerations since a number
of large corporations would gain a stake in Kuwait’s
future.
Domestically, reform is also linked to national
security since it is viewed as a way of ensuring that
Kuwaitis have a chance to participate in the political
system. Such policies may be valuable in undercutting
the attraction of extra-constitutional activity and
violent extremism. Unfortunately, some nonviolent
but ultra-conservative Kuwaitis have been elected to
parliament including a member of parliament who has
stated that he refuses to call bin Laden a terrorist.251
Democratization should not be confused (as it often is in
the United States) with the empowerment of moderates.
One of the chief goals of the Islamic opposition may be
to impose Islamic law on the nation.252 Domestic critics
of the Islamists maintain that they wish to divide the
society into “pious” and “lax” Muslims and take steps
to reform the lax Muslims. These critics further maintain
that the Islamists seek a segregated system of education
as well as powerful morals enforcement police such as
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those found in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan
under the Taliban.253 Within the parliament, the Islamist
bloc is quite strong and can make common cause with
other traditionalists. Some analysts suggest that the
Kuwaiti government inadvertently supported the rise
of radical Islamic organizations when it closed liberal
societies and associations in 1986 because they strongly
opposed the dissolution of parliament at that time.254
Other liberal Kuwaiti reformers have indicated a deep
concern about the increasing influence, organizational
skills, and militancy of self-described Salafists and
other ultra-conservative Islamists throughout Kuwaiti
society.255 Some oppose the legalization of political
parties in Kuwait at this time because they realize such
a move would strengthen the power of the Islamists.
The inclusiveness strategy, despite its drawbacks,
does appear to be showing some results for the system’s
legitimacy. Key opposition leaders in Kuwait do not
appear interested in overthrowing al Sabah rule and at
least, for the time being, seem interested in reforming
Kuwaiti politics and making it more responsive and
transparent to popular will. Moreover, the decision
of an overwhelming number of Kuwaitis, including
oppositionists, to rally to the royal family in exile after
the 1990 invasion has been treated by some scholars as
something of an acid test for al Sabah legitimacy so long
as the al Sabahs respect the Kuwaiti constitution.256 In
the initial aftermath of the 1991 war, the government
(consisting most prominently of the emir and his
cabinet) and National Assembly often had notable
disagreements. Nevertheless, each side saw value in
cooperation with the other, and neither side wanted to
appear anything less than united in the face of the Iraqi
enemy.
One of the central points of debate on democratization has consistently involved the respective roles
75

of the executive government of the emir and the
legislative role of the National Assembly. In particular,
the parliament has sought to maintain and expand its
authority to oversee and criticize the government, with
a special focus on government spending so as to prevent and expose corruption, ineptitude, and overspending. An elected body willing and able to challenge the
government over the issue of corruption is not the usual
way of doing business in the Gulf. Nevertheless, the
system of divided power often presents the danger of
a stalemated and bickering political leadership which
the Kuwaitis continue to accept as part of the price of
democratic rule. More annoyingly, bickering members
of the ruling family have sometimes enlisted members
of the National Assembly and the press in their efforts
to discredit rivals. These problems reached the point
where Emir Sabah al Ahmed al Sabah convened
an April 2007 meeting of 190 senior members of the
ruling family above the age of 40 in an effort to calm
the situation. At this gathering, he stated, “Every one
of you wants to become a minister, and all of you are
fighting this out in the media.”257 The emir’s decision
to confront this issue in such a public way is quite
striking.
At the time of the last election in 2006, Kuwait had
25 small electoral districts. This has now changed, with
the number of districts reduced to 5, which will be
utilized in the next parliamentary election regardless
of when it occurs. According to a number of critics,
there have been serious problems with vote buying
in Kuwaiti elections, and the sharp reduction in the
number of voting districts is expected to help reverse
this trend.258 There is also a possibility that larger
districts will help to overcome Sunni-Shiite differences
in Kuwait by cutting across religiously divided urban
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areas. The two groups often tend to live in different
neighborhoods, creating a situation where candidates
may be tempted to use polarizing rhetoric in a way
that would not occur in a larger and more diverse
district.259 The reduction of the number of districts
was a major demand of the Kuwaiti reform movement
and especially the young people who demonstrated
in favor of these reforms and identified their political
movement with the color Orange.260
The most recent elections in Kuwait have been lively
with opposition candidates who feel free to criticize
the Sabah family for such things as failing to provide
adequate services and sponsoring corruption.261
No major candidates have seriously challenged the
legitimacy of Sabah authority, but they have criticized
its behavior, sometimes in exceptionally tough
terms. One candidate even criticized the “dictatorial
behavior” of Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad al
Ahmad al Sabah.262 Such statements would be swiftly
and brutally punished in a variety of other Middle
Eastern states. Kuwaiti political culture is much more
generous, perhaps because of the strength of Kuwaiti
institutions.
Additionally, a significant amount of the initiative
for certain types of reform comes from the ruling family
rather than the parliament. This is the case with the
effort to provide women with the vote. The motives for
this move may have had an idealistic component, but
the Sabahs may also have believed that women voters
would produce a friendly parliament with fewer
hardline Islamists. This trend did not materialize in
2006 to the clear surprise of some liberal candidates
who had counted on the “women’s vote.”263 Instead,
many women voted for Islamists, who ironically had
opposed giving them the right to vote in the first place.
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It is unclear what long-term impact women voters
will have on the make-up of parliament. A best case
scenario would suggest that a majority of women will
eventually emerge as less tolerant of Islamic extremism,
but this scenario has yet to be played out.
Beyond the 2006 election, other evidence has been
put forward suggesting that women voters may not
cause the increased liberalization of parliament in the
near term. Kuwait University’s student union, the
elected student government, is dominated by Islamists
despite the fact that both men and women students
(totally 18,000) may vote in the student elections.264
Some members of the Islamist groups dominating the
campus harass young women over what they consider
non-Islamic dress and have forced the university to
build expensive separate facilities for male and female
students.265 Moreover, the women who vote for the
Islamist student government are college students
who would normally be expected to be more liberal
and nontraditional than other less educated Kuwaiti
women. Nevertheless, another important trend must
be considered before reading too much into these votes.
This factor is the large number of Kuwaiti students
choosing to go abroad for education, especially to
the United States and Europe. Thousands of students
attend overseas schools each year, often on state
scholarships. Such students, almost by definition, are
more open to liberal ideas, and some have returned
to become leaders in the reform movement. Both men
and women who study overseas are not included in
the Kuwait University Student Union voting, and their
absence from the country during their educational
years naturally skews the voting. A number of Kuwaiti
women students have risen to become student officers
in the overseas branches of the National Association of
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Kuwaiti students, with some moving on to important
academic, political, and other leadership roles in
Kuwait once they return.
Unfortunately, by 2007 the number of Kuwaiti
students studying in the United States was only around
2,500, and this low figure may show the lingering
effects of Kuwaiti concerns about U.S. perceptions
of the Arab world after 9/11. The U.S. Embassy in
Kuwait has responded to this problem by strongly and
continuously assuring Kuwaiti students that they are
welcome in the United States, supporting educational
fairs, and simplifying on-line application procedures
for students interested in study in the United States.266
Some students, however, continue to believe that
they will face serious problems with visas and that
unreasonable security demands against them will occur
while on travel to the United States.267 Clearly, it is in
U.S. interest to have large numbers of Kuwaitis study
in the United States and gain a strong and nuanced
view of U.S. policies. Everything that can reasonably
be done to help support this goal would appear to be
worth consideration.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly when
considering reform, the Kuwaiti parliament continues
to press forward in asserting its constitutional role.
In early 2007 parliamentarians were moving forward
with a vote of no-confidence on Health Minister
Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah al Sabah, of the ruling
family, to determine the validity of accusations of
incompetence and mismanagement. Sheikh Ahmad
had been questioned in parliament on February 19,
2007, but failed to convince a number of legislators not
to call the vote which centered on issues of financial
mismanagement and “grave medical errors that led to
the death of several patients.”268 Rather than allow this
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to happen, the emir dissolved the Kuwaiti cabinet and
instructed Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Mohammad
al Ahmad al Sabah (who was retained) to put together
a new cabinet. No minister has ever been voted out of
office in Kuwaiti history, although several resigned
to avoid no-confidence votes.269 Some Kuwaitis have
suggested that the country needs a more reformist
cabinet that is no longer so overwhelming dominated by
members of the ruling family.270 Others have expressed
disappointment with the continuing disagreement and
governmental deadlock.271
Conclusion.
This monograph has illustrated that the destruction
of the Saddam Hussein regime will not undermine the
basis for U.S.-Kuwaiti military cooperation. Both sides
continue to have important security needs that are wellserved by the continuation of the relationship. Both the
U.S. and Kuwaiti leadership need to understand that
the U.S.-Kuwaiti military and security partnership can
continue to serve the needs of both countries in the
post-Saddam era. This alliance should be understood
to be more than a temporary marriage of convenience
brought about by the problem of Saddam Hussein.
With these factors in mind, the following recommendations are offered.
1. The U.S. leadership must continue to bear
in mind that Kuwait is a more important ally than
its small territory and population would imply.
Moreover, Kuwait may be especially important during
the current time frame as the United States and the
region attempt to cope with continuing problems with
Iraq, Iran, democratization, and counterterrorism.
Kuwait, as has been noted throughout this monograph,
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can contribute significantly to managing all of these
problems. Kuwait’s possession of one of the region’s
best harbors, as well as its continued willingness to host
U.S. troops, stands as an invitation for U.S. military
personnel to be the best possible guests.
2. The U.S. Government must avoid making statements that appear to take the Kuwaitis for granted.
U.S. politicians that speak of redeploying from Iraq to
Kuwait, for example, might do well to note that such a
move would only be done after a careful exchange of
views with the Kuwaitis and with Kuwaiti permission.
Proclaiming a policy that intensely involves Kuwait
while assuming that the Kuwaitis will do just about
anything that U.S. leaders say is inappropriate and
portrays Kuwait as an unequal ally. Such an image will
ultimately be resented and could product a backlash
that harms smooth U.S.-Kuwaiti coordination.
3. The United States needs to speak out in favor
of Kuwaiti democracy and note the positive lessons
of Kuwaiti democratization. With all of the setbacks
that have taken place in the Middle Eastern drive for
democracy, it is important to note that Kuwaiti progress
in democratization and possible lessons of the Kuwaiti
model are too often virtually ignored. This process of
speaking out will not only be of interest to the Kuwaitis,
but it may also help to educate the American public
about the value of U.S.-Kuwaiti national security ties. In
the West, Kuwait is widely known to have a parliament
but it is not clear if the strength of this parliament is
fully understood or appreciated. The United States
must also accept that democracy is still democracy
when politicians we do not like are elected—so long
as these people also respect democratic institutions.
We cannot fairly support democracy only in cases
where the United States approves of the candidates
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who are elected. Parliaments support evolutionary
change in most instances and the Kuwaiti model may
prepare citizens for an ever expanding and deepening
democratic outlook.
4. Both the United States and Kuwait must
continue to understand that the dominant threat to
Kuwait is no longer a conventional Iraqi attack. The
United States must continue to work with Kuwait to
meet evolving national security challenges with the
understanding that subversion, terrorism, and huge
refugee problems are becoming more important.
Further complications in Iraq leading to an escalating
civil war must not be allowed to spill over into Kuwait.
Rather, Kuwait must be a force for helping the United
States and the world deal with ongoing Iraqi political
problems and humanitarian challenges.
5. The United States cannot expect endless
gratitude for the 1991 liberation to be the basis of
policy towards Kuwait. Gratitude, a highly perishable
asset in most cases, is often easy to rationalize away.
In this instance, Kuwaitis can plausibly maintain that
the United States liberated their country in 1991 for
its own geopolitical reasons and concerns about oil
rather than because of any special concern about the
Kuwaiti population. Kuwaitis should not be thought
of as ungrateful when all they seek is to present their
views to U.S. leaders or when they disagree with U.S.
policies based on a reasonable perception of their own
national interest. Clearly, more areas of agreement
than disagreement exist between the United States and
Kuwait on important issues now and in the foreseeable
future.
6. The United States needs to be aware that
Kuwaiti-Iraqi differences will continue despite
Saddam’s removal from power. While Kuwait will
hopefully never have another enemy such as Saddam
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Hussein, its problems with Iraq could, under certain
circumstances, reach extremely high levels. Kuwaitis
need to be given strong signals that the United
States is pro-Kuwait and not just anti-Saddam. This
partnership is not simply a marriage of convenience
based on controlling the predations of one dictator.
Additionally, the United States must try to remain
aware of any emerging Iraq-Kuwait differences and do
whatever is possible to contain them before a flashpoint
is reached.
7. The United States needs to appreciate and
understand that Kuwait’s geographical position and
Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian mix often compel it to seek
normal relations with Tehran, while nevertheless
not trusting the Iranians. Iran, despite its worrisome
foreign policy, remains an important neighbor, and the
United States must not overreact to reasonable levels
of Kuwaiti-Iranian cooperation. This tendency will
probably remain strong while Iraq appears unstable,
but may also be important if Iraq is eventually unified
under a strong central government.
8. The United States must continue to do all that
it can to support Kuwaiti counterterrorism efforts.
This policy is important since terrorism in Kuwait
may rise in response to continuing instability in
Iraq. Any effort to strengthen Kuwait might involve
major efforts at intelligence sharing about aspects of
the internal Iraq situation. Kuwait’s national security
needs may change as the situation in Iraq evolves and
may become particularly severe should the United
States choose to withdraw substantial numbers of its
forces. The United States, to the extent it can, needs to
help Kuwait develop policies that target dangerous
terrorists without alienating significant segments of the
Kuwaiti population. The ideal response to pro-Iranian
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terrorism would be to confront such outrages without
implying the Kuwait’s entire Shi’ite population is
under suspicion.
9. The U.S. Government should continue to
strongly support efforts by educational organizations
to bring Kuwaiti students to the United States to
study. Kuwaiti students trained in the United States
often seem more willing to embrace the concept of
reform and are able to see past Iranian and other onedimensional caricatures of Western values and U.S.
foreign policy. Early, strong, and consistent efforts by
the U.S. Embassy to support this goal have been vital,
but the embassy cannot do this job alone. To the extent
possible, efforts should be made to determine how
homeland security requirements can be maximized
while minimizing the perceptions that Kuwaitis and
other Arabs are disliked and unwelcome in the United
States. Both the United States and the region may pay
a terrible price if Kuwaiti and other Arab students
chose to stop coming to the United States in significant
numbers.
10. The U.S. Department of Defense and the
U.S. Department of the Army should continue
to seek out ways to improve military-to-military
coordination with the Kuwaitis. Such efforts would
include policies to keep the Kuwaitis involved in joint
and multilateral military exercises with the United
States and other friendly nations. Continuing efforts
to welcome Kuwaiti officers to the United States for
military training and education are also important. A
special effort should also be made to ensure that those
U.S. offices most involved with Kuwaiti liaison duties
remain fully staffed with top notch personnel.
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